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ABSTRACT 
We send e-mails using Google’s Gmail, access the Internet through Verizon’s towers, and host our private files on 
Dropbox’s drives.  Against this backdrop, the Fourth Amendment faces a digital paradox: because a user’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” defines its protections, users have no privacy.  Users cannot expect privacy 
when they voluntarily disclose documents to third parties.  If we base our privacy from the Government on our 
privacy from tech companies, then we are left with none at all.   
This Article advocates a different approach.  For almost a decade, the Supreme Court has suggested that property 
rights provide an alternate path to Fourth Amendment protections.  But neither jurists nor scholars have yet tried 
to apply this doctrine to digital papers.  This Article suggests three guiding principles.  First, constitutional property 
protections depend on underlying state property rights.  Though the constitutional protections remain the same, the 
underlying ownership rights shift as we adopt and discard new property law.  Second, and surprisingly, the Court 
has never defined when a property right proves sufficiently house-, paper-, or effect-like to create a constitutional 
interest.  But common law materials, caselaw, and scholarship all indicate that the right to exclude others makes 
something your property.  Third, modern laws like the Stored Communications Act grant information sources the 
right to prevent recipients from propagating that information.  This exclusion right triggers constitutional property 
protections. 
With this new foundation for a property-focused digital Fourth Amendment, hopefully we can reclaim in some 
small measure what Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis called “the right to be let alone.”1   
 
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., Penn State University (Computer Science).  This 
Article was written while I was a Visiting Assistant Professor at Penn State Law School.  Michael 
Antonino and Ettore Carchia, Penn State Law Class of 2020, provided valuable research assistance.  
Thanks to Richard Epstein, Ben Johnson, Orin Kerr, and Megan Wright for answering questions, 
providing feedback, and generally making my ideas better.  I am tempted to blame errors on them, 
but that would be both unkind and untrue. 
 1 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Susan Freiwald and retired 
Magistrate Judge Stephen William Smith criticized the Supreme Court for 
its slow reaction to developing technology.2  As the authors point out, in just 
one year, police sought cellular tracking information more than 120,000 
times.3  Given that law enforcement often requests information for multiple 
phones, they estimate that the government may have illegally obtained four 
million reports since 2001.  This staggering intrusion on citizens’ private lives 
would horrify the Founders. 
While many Americans have accepted living their lives on Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, and whatever new social media platform finds purchase, 
it seems unlikely that Americans have fully absorbed the implications.  
Pervasive digital surveillance means the Government knows when we visit a 
therapist and when we visit a drug store.  It means the Government knows 
what books we download to our Kindles and what movies we watch on 
Netflix. 
The Constitution poses no obstacle to Government’s all-seeing eye.  
Under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, defined by Justice Harlan in 
Katz v. United States, we retain constitutional rights only for those things that 
we can reasonably expect will remain private.4  And we cannot reasonably 
expect that our data will remain private when held by third parties.5  In a 
world where Verizon compiles our cell phone records, Google scans our e-
mail, and Amazon maintains our reading lists, what data is not held by third 
parties? 
The Court has recently tried to build substantive limits into the third-
party doctrine,6 but the extent and effectiveness of those limits will remain 
 
 2 See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle:  A Near-Perfect Surveillance, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 205, 231–35 (2018). 
 3 See id., at 232 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 13–14, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402)). 
 4 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of 
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 5 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”). 
 6 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“[W]hen Smith was decided in 1979, 
few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, conveying to the 
wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s 
movements.  We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel circumstances.”).   
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unclear for many years.  Often by the time the Court addresses an issue, the 
world has moved on.  Before cell phones, pagers were used by tens of millions 
of Americans.7  Perhaps due to their frequent use by drug dealers,8 the lower 
courts often resolved disputes over pager searches.9  Yet the Supreme Court 
first addressed pager searches in 2010,10 nearly a decade after the New York 
Times noted declining usage numbers11 and more than three years after Steve 
Jobs took the stage to announce the iPhone.12 
But we cannot fault the Court, at least not the current Court.  Rather, 
Katz itself creates the problem.  Under Katz, constitutional standards depend 
on “reasonable expectations of privacy.”  But how can the Court determine 
those expectations before technology matures and society’s relationship with 
it stabilizes?13  Even more disturbing: What if law enforcement never permits 
a privacy culture to develop around a new technology?  With interminable 
intrusions and relentless records requests, can law enforcement prevent a 
stable societal expectation that online lives will remain private?14  Privacy law 
necessarily entails uncertainty. 
By contrast, property law provides certainty by design.  Law students 
struggling with the fee tail, the remainderman, and the contingent 
 
 7 See Jeffrey Selingo, The Bell Is Tolling for the Beeper, N.Y.  TIMES (Apr. 11, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/11/technology/the-bell-is-tolling-for-the-beeper.html 
(discussing the rise and fall of the beeper). 
 8 See Jonathan M. Moses, Message Is Out on Beepers, WASH. POST (July 11, 1988), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/07/11/message-is-out-on-
beepers/58840caa-523e-413b-9224-60ad94d7803f/ (“[F]ederal narcotics agents estimate that at 
least 90 percent of drug dealers use [pagers].”). 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Garcia, 991 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Or. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 168 
F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1999) (analyzing the reasonableness of beeper searches); United States v. Reyes, 
922 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (conducting a similar analysis); United States v. Blas, No. 90-
CR-162, 1990 WL 265179 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 1990) (conducting a similar analysis). 
 10 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (deciding on the reasonableness of pager searches). 
 11 See Selingo, supra note 7 (noting that the number of pager users declined by eight million between 
1998 and 2000). 
 12 See John Markoff, Apple Introduces Innovative Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.  10, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/10/technology/10apple.html (discussing Apple’s 
introduction of the new cellphone). 
 13 See United States v.  Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Katz test rests 
on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of 
privacy expectations.  But technology can change those expectations.  Dramatic technological 
change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux . . . .”). 
 14 Cf. Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring) (“[C]onstitutional 
litigation increasingly involves cutting-edge technologies.  If courts leapfrog the underlying 
constitutional merits in cases raising novel issues like digital privacy, then constitutional 
clarity . . . remains exasperatingly elusive.  Result:  blurred constitutional contours as technological 
innovation outpaces legal adaptation.”).  But see Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
101, 107 (2008) (suggesting that the Court understands the “logical trap” of considering police 
officer conduct and avoided it by rooting their analysis in broader societal expectations). 
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beneficiary can be forgiven their skepticism.  But if we see a house, we need 
not ask whether someone has an expectation of privacy in it, or whether 
society would call that expectation reasonable.  “If the property exists, then 
property rights exist . . . .”15  Because the house is property, someone owns it.  
It might belong to an individual or family, possibly a bank, or maybe the 
state.  But someone.  As Professor James Stern puts it:  “For each thing in 
existence, the law of property tells us who is in charge and to what extent as 
well as who has authority to decide how the thing will be used when disputes 
over use arise.”16  By shifting the focus from privacy to property, the contours 
of the right should stabilize earlier and more firmly than under Katz. 
Nor should we worry that building up property law will tear down privacy 
law.  Property law enhances privacy.17  When I shut the door to my house, I 
expect that criminal trespass law (and a stout deadbolt) will repel intruders.  
Property law (and the intruder’s concern that I might have a shotgun) thereby 
enhances my privacy.  Revitalizing Fourth Amendment property precedent 
can only serve our “right to be let alone.”18 
But property law’s application to the Fourth Amendment and 
particularly to digital technology requires defining digital property rights.  In 
Part I, this Article looks to how we determine property rights generally.  
Specifically, what law applies?  Common law as it existed at the Founding, 
positive law that has developed since that time, or some combination?  In 
Part II, this Article considers which property rights engage the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections.  In Part III, it examines modern statutory schemes 
and considers whether they trigger the property rights described in Part II.  
In Part IV, it considers whether digital documents are Fourth Amendment 
papers.  In Part V, it considers the specific data types commonly created by 
modern technology, like cloud files, e-mails, other messaging files, and 
metadata. 
I.   EVER ANCIENT OR EVER NEW? 
After decades with Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” as the 
principal test for the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has revitalized 
 
 15 James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CAL. L. REV. 277, 317 (2013). 
 16 Id. at 294. 
 17 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 94–95 
(2012) (explaining the positive law model for the Fourth Amendment, where “the government 
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy when it violates the suspect’s rights under some source 
of nonconstitutional law such as property law”). 
 18 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1. 
1276 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol.  22:5 
property rights as another protection for private interests.19  In United States v. 
Jones, the Supreme Court emphasized that this approach remained viable 
and indeed never lapsed, but rather fell into disuse after Katz.20 
The Supreme Court may have taken a twisty path to its current respect 
for property rights.  But those rights always had a deep relationship with the 
Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, countless Founding-era sources extol property 
rights and decry their invasion.21  In Entick v. Carrington, one case that 
 
 19 The property-rights candle was never fully extinguished, even at Katz’s zenith.  See, e.g., Soldal v. 
Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992) (“Respondents rely principally on precedents such as Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 . . . (1967), Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
294 . . . (1967), and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 . . . (1974), to demonstrate that the Fourth 
Amendment is only marginally concerned with property rights.  But the message of those cases is 
that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.”); United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The owner 
of property, of course, has a right to exclude from it all the world, including the Government, and 
a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own purposes.  When the Government attaches an 
electronic monitoring device to that property, it infringes that exclusionary right; in a fundamental 
sense it has converted the property to its own use.”); see also United States v. James Daniel Good 
Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) (“Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property 
rights.”). 
 20 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth 
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the 
areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.  Katz did not repudiate that 
understanding.”); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S 1, 5 (2013) (“By reason of our decision in Katz 
v. United States, property rights ‘are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations’—but 
though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amendment’s 
protections ‘when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally 
protected area[.]’” (citations omitted)).  Pre-Jones precedent provides some reason to doubt this 
narrative, given that the Court repeatedly criticized crusty old property and tort law.  See Silverman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably 
measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.”); Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257, 266 (1960) (“Distinctions such as those between ‘lessee,’ ‘licensee,’ ‘invitee’ and ‘guest,’ 
often only of gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately 
referable to constitutional safeguards.”); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752 (1952) (“[I]t is 
doubtful that the niceties of tort law initiated almost two and a half centuries ago by the case of the 
Six Carpenters, 8 Coke 146 (a), cited by petitioner, are of much aid in determining rights under the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765) (“The great end, for which men 
entered into society, was to secure their property . . . .  [E]very invasion of property, be it ever so 
minute, is a trespass.”); THE FATHER OF CANDOR, A LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, 
THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS, AND SECURITY FOR THE PEACE OR BEHAVIOR; WITH A VIEW TO SOME 
LATE PROCEEDINGS, AND THE DEFENCE OF THEM BY THE MAJORITY  58 (3d ed.  1765) 
(“Without these limitations [abrogating general warrants], there is no liberty or free enjoyment of 
person or property, but every part of a man’s most valuable possessions and privacies, is liable to 
the ravage, inroad, and inspection of suspicious ministers . . . .”); see also William Baude & James Y. 
Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1838 (2016) (“When 
we look at the nature of the harm or intrusion [in Entick and Wilkes], the first-step question, each 
event stresses property.”); see generally Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1181 (2016) (discussing Founding-era sources throughout). 
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motivated the Fourth Amendment, Lord Camden called property a principal 
purpose for human civilization: “The great end, for which men entered into 
society, was to secure their property.”22  William Penn considered ownership 
and undisturbed possession essential English rights, saying “that which they 
have is rightly theirs, and nobody’s else.”23  Colonial Diplomat and Virginia 
delegate to the Continental Congress Arthur Lee called property rights “the 
guardian of every other right,” saying that “to deprive a people of this, is in 
fact to deprive them of their liberty.”24 
In protecting “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” the Framers were 
protecting property.25  Indeed, it appears that the Framers eschewed the 
word “property” precisely because it was too narrow, connoting only personal 
property, while the Framers wanted to include both personal and commercial 
property.26 
But while respect for property rights runs deep in Western history, the 
theory establishing the moral and philosophical underpinning for those rights 
stands famously divided.27  John Locke would say that property arises when 
labor improves something provided by God, as when felling trees to make a 
 
 22 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066. 
 23 JACK N.  RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 294 (1996). 
 24 JAMES W.  ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 32 (3d ed.  2008) (“The framers of the Pennsylvania constitution attached 
a high priority to property rights, viewing private property as fully consistent with the type of 
democratic society they wished to foster”).  
 25 See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to 
property . . . .]”); Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 (“Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels:  they 
are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an 
inspection . . . .”); Michael C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 113 (2019) (“[T]he text 
of the Fourth Amendment refers to types of property—‘houses, papers, and effects’—and thus 
reflects the Amendment’s historically ‘close connection to property.’ The British common law at 
the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted likewise expressed the concept of a search as one in 
which an unconsented entry onto property occurred.”). 
 26 See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 708 (1999) 
(“The term ‘effects’ may have carried a broader connotation insofar as it was commonly used to 
denote commercial goods.”); Donohue, supra note 21, at 1301 (“The Committee changed 
Madison’s language that protected ‘persons, houses, papers, and other property, to ‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.’  In making this alteration, the Committee extended the meaning beyond 
personal property or possessions (as implied in ‘other property’) to include commercial items and 
goods.”).  Perhaps inadvertently, the Framers’ choice may have likewise narrowed the Amendment.  
In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the Supreme Court explains that the term “effects” 
was not understood to include real property, and thus does not include open fields.  See id. at 176–
77. 
 27 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531 
(2005) (“Notwithstanding its importance, property law has eluded both a consistent definition and 
a unified conceptual framework.  Indeed, modern property scholarship has utterly splintered the 
field.”). 
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house.28  The Hegelian would say that property has acquired some uniquely 
personal value, like a home or wedding ring.29  The utilitarian would say that 
property rights incentivize development and best allocate finite resources.30  
And these systems are not alone, nor are they mutually exclusive; for 
example, our intellectual property system builds on both Lockeian respect 
for labor and utilitarian incentives.31 
Thus arrives our first significant question:  How do we determine which 
property rights to recognize?  Do we acknowledge only those property rights 
recognized when the Constitution was ratified?  Do we acknowledge only 
property rights recognized by state law now?  Must we find some middle 
ground? 
This question touches on a deep and unresolved question at property 
law’s heart: Does property exist only because the legislature says it does, or 
does it come from somewhere else?  As Professor Robert Brauneis explains, 
under the former positive law model, “property is defined in terms of the 
advantages—the rights, powers, and immunities—afforded owners under 
existing positive law.”32  Property rights are a drifting target, forever blown 
this way and that by legislative whim.  Meanwhile, under the latter natural 
 
 28 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 209 (1821), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=K5UIAAAAQAAJ (“Though the earth, and all inferior 
creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has 
any right to but himself.  The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his.  Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”). 
 29 See Michael A.  Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1485, 1494 
(2007) (identifying homes and wedding rings as items so personal that they must be respected as 
property under the Hegelian-based personhood theory, which argues that “the strength of the 
entitlement increas[es] as the object becomes more central to one’s personhood”); see also Robert 
Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice 
Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 640 (1996) (“[T]he 
institution of property is due, at least in part, to a fundamental element of psychology—the desire 
to continue enjoying something that one has enjoyed for a long time and to which one has become 
firmly attached.”). 
 30 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (9th ed 2014) (explaining that property 
rights incentivize investment); see also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 
1244–45 (1968) (concluding that overuse of common resources could be prevented by “sell[ing] 
them off as private property”). 
 31 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV.  1125, 1139–40 (2000) (“The 
economic rationale for intellectual property law arises from a public goods problem with 
information products that this law strives to overcome . . . . [W]ithout a legal protection system, 
creators will find it difficult to exclude free-riders from appropriating the fruits of their labor and 
selling identical or very similar products in the marketplace at a cheaper price.  The prospect of 
being unable to recoup research and development costs may deter such investments from being 
made in the first place.”). 
 32 Brauneis, supra note 29, at 624. 
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rights model, a property right represents “an unchanging ideal boundary 
between a property owner and the surrounding community.”33  To put this 
concretely, the positive law model would say that tenants have rights only 
because the legislature created landlord-tenant law, while the natural rights 
model would suggest that landlord-tenant relationships have always existed, 
and always imply basic rights and responsibilities. 
This divide over property rights touches on a broader battle over natural 
rights vs. positive law generally.  Jurists and scholars have waged this war on 
many fronts, with various rhetorical weapons.  Some dismiss natural rights 
entirely.34  Others suggest that natural rights influenced the Constitution’s 
writing35 and may influence its interpretation.36  Still others suggest that 
natural rights provide a broad basis for striking down contrary laws.37 
Natural rights deeply influenced the Framers, who lauded those rights in 
the Declaration38 and incorporated some into the Constitution.  But the bulk 
of evidence—from the Framers themselves, from early court opinions, and 
from scholarly examination—suggests that once written, the Constitution 
became the operative guarantor of natural rights.  In 1798, Justice Iredell 
explained that natural rights were not judicially enforceable:  “[S]ome 
speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, 
in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a government, any Court 
of Justice would possess a power to declare it so.”39  In 1830, Chief Justice 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 See, e.g., id. at 637 (“A constitutional directive to judges to test legislative enactments by engaging in 
moral reasoning was for Holmes no better than a directive to follow the commands of ghosts—if 
you don’t believe in ghosts, it’s hard to comply with the directive.”). 
 35 See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 
1517 (2011) (“When it came to writing a Constitution, the Framers aimed to create a positive law 
that would protect pre-existing natural rights.”). 
 36 See id. at 1525 (“Heller tells us that natural law can factor into constitutional interpretation in subtle, 
but significant ways.  It tells us that, where a constitutional provision codified a pre-existing, natural 
right, the historical understanding of that natural right can clarify ambiguities in the constitutional 
text and elucidate the rationale and scope of the constitutional right.”). 
 37 See Thomas E. Towe, Natural Law and the Ninth Amendment, 2 PEPP. L. REV. 270, 305 (1975) (“To the 
founding fathers, the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights constituted a partial list of those 
‘essential elements of the law of nature,’ which constituted an absolute limitation on the powers of 
government.  These rights were considered the prime requisites of free government and were the 
rights reserved to the people when the political compact, that brought the people out of the state of 
nature, was entered into.  Neither the legislature nor any other agency of government could modify 
or evade these rights.”). 
 38 See O’Scannlain, supra note 35, at 1516 (“The Declaration is not saying, ‘we are starting this new 
government and we are going to give our citizens all sorts of new rights.’  It is saying that human 
beings have innate rights that everyone has a moral obligation to respect, whether or not there is a 
government to define and protect those rights.”). 
 39 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J.). 
1280 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol.  22:5 
Marshall said the same, explaining that stretching the Constitution to remedy 
every ill would do violence to that document: “[T]he constitution of the 
United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every abuse of 
power which may be committed by the state governments.”40  Writing in the 
late 1870s, Thomas Cooley concluded that “except where the constitution 
has imposed limits upon the legislative power, it must be considered as 
practically absolute, whether it operate according to natural justice or not in 
any particular case.”41  As Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, when 
deciding cases, “nothing would be consulted but the constitution and the 
laws.”42  This judicial humility accords with assurances from jurists like 
Robert Bork and Diarmuid O’Scannlain that while they do not doubt that 
natural rights exist, they do question judges’ ability to discern those rights.43 
Does this leave other natural rights unprotected?  No.  To the Founding 
Generation, the Legislature and the Executive had an obligation to 
independently evaluate a law, both against the Constitution and natural 
rights.  As Chief Justice Marshall explained:  “The interest, wisdom, and 
justice of the representative body, and its relations with its constituents, 
furnish the only security, where there is no express contract, against unjust 
and excessive taxation; as well as against unwise legislation generally.”44 
Narrowing our discussion from the general to the specific, this legislative 
deference suggests that the Fourth Amendment should respect property 
rights as defined by legislatures.  It seems unlikely that the Framers would 
freeze property law in place at the Revolution.  At that very time, they were 
pushing to eliminate the entail, a traditional property right that consolidated 
wealth.  Thomas Jefferson introduced a bill to abolish the entail in Virginia, 
describing it as a practice that perpetuated “a Patrician order.”45  By ending 
it, he hoped to likewise end the “aristocracy of wealth” and “make an 
 
 40 Providence Bank v.  Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830). 
 41 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 204 (4th ed. 1878). 
 42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 43 See Robert H.  Bork, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 66 
(1990) (“Judges, like the rest of us, are apt to confuse their strongly held beliefs with the order of 
nature.”); see also O’Scannlain, supra note 35, at 1521 (agreeing with Bork).  But see Randy E. Barnett, 
Getting Normative:  The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST.  COMMENT.  93, 
111 (1995) (“[W]e should resolve our historical and textual doubts in favor of protecting 
unenumerated rights . . . .”). 
 44 Providence Bank, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 563. 
 45 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography (1821), in THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
36 (1858).  But see Claire Priest, The End of Entail: Information, Institutions, and Slavery in the American 
Revolutionary Period, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 277, 280 (2015) (suggesting that this “dominant historical 
account” ignores how entailed property shielded small landowners from creditors). 
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opening for the aristocracy of virtue and talent.”46  Multiple states abolished 
the entail during this period,47 some by writing the prohibition into their 
constitution.48  Thus, in the late 1700s, the Framers were intimately involved 
in modifying a traditional property right.  And this proves just one among 
many examples.  As Professor Thomas Merrill points out, equitable 
servitudes, community property, condominiums, and securitized debt were 
all later inventions.49 
Freezing property law at the Revolution would show profound and 
uncharacteristic shortsightedness.  Instead, as Justice Chase explains in Calder 
v. Bull, while property rights may arise from natural principles, their precise 
boundaries must be “prescribed by positive law.”50  John Hart Ely would call 
property one of “the Constitution’s various open-ended delegations to the 
future.”51 
This might seem to run contrary to originalist positions, often framed on 
a fixed, unchanging Constitution.  But here the Constitution does not 
change, even though the property it protects may shift.  As Justice Scalia 
explained, though the objects change, the rights remain the same:  
[A] latter-day alteration of property rights would also produce a latter-day 
alteration of the Fourth Amendment outcome—without altering the Fourth 
Amendment itself. 
. . . .  
. . . [O]ur unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of law that 
might themselves change. . . .  This reference to changeable law presents no 
problems for the originalist.  No one supposes that the meaning of the 
Constitution changes as States expand and contract property rights.”52 
If a legislature decides when property rights attach, can it also eliminate 
those rights?  No.  Once rights vest, the Government must respect them.  The 
 
 46 JEFFERSON, supra note 45, at 36. 
 47 Priest, supra note 45, at 278 (“During the American Revolutionary Era, New York, Virginia, 
Georgia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and later Missouri and Mississippi abolished the fee tail.”). 
 48 See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. LI (“Estates shall not be entailed . . . .”). 
 49 Thomas W.  Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 945 (2000). 
 50 Calder v.  Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798) (“[T]he right of property, in its origin, could only arise 
from compact, express, or implied, and I think it is the better opinion, that the right, as well as the mode, 
or manner, of acquiring property, and of alienating or transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is 
conferred by society; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by 
positive law.”). 
 51 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 39 (1980) 
(“[The Framers] certainly didn’t have natural law in mind when the Constitution’s various open-
ended delegations to the future were inserted and approved, which undoubtedly is one reason the 
Constitution at no point refers to natural law.”). 
 52 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143–44 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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early Court established this point first in 1798,53 reiterating it in 1810,54 
1815,55 1829,56 and 1874.57  And this point finds echoes today in cases like 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.58 There the Supreme Court held that 
government can take property without compensation only if the owner 
asserts unvested rights, those to which he never had title in the first place.59 
This approach makes practical sense.  It does leave open the question 
whether natural property rights may augment positive law.  For instance, take 
the unlikely scenario where a legislature eliminates fee simple ownership 
entirely.  We need not resolve this question.  As this Article will address in 
Part III, each theory conferring property rights on digital documents derives 
from an existing positive law framework like the Stored Communications Act 
or state privacy laws.60 
 
 53 See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388–89 (“The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they 
may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may 
command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or 
punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private 
property.  To maintain that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not 
been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free 
republican governments.”). 
 54 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135 (1810) (“[I]f an act be done under a law, a succeeding 
legislature cannot undo it.  The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power.  Conveyances 
have been made, those conveyances have vested legal estates, and, if those estates may be seized by 
the sovereign authority, still, that they originally vested is a fact, and cannot cease to be a fact.”). 
 55 See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43, 50–51 (1815) (“If the legislature possessed the authority to make 
such a grant and confirmation [of property rights], it is very clear to our minds that it vested an 
indefeasible and irrevocable title.  We have no knowledge of any authority or principle which could 
support the doctrine that a legislative grant is revocable in its own nature, and held only durante bene 
placito.  Such a doctrine would uproot the very foundations of almost all the land titles in Virginia, 
and is utterly inconsistent with a great and fundamental principle of republican government, the 
right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of their property regally acquired.”). 
 56 See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S.  627, 657–58 (1829) (“[A] grant or title to lands once made by the 
legislature to any person or corporation is irrevocable, and cannot be re-assumed by any subsequent 
legislative act; . . . a different doctrine is utterly inconsistent with the great and fundamental 
principle of a republican government, and with the right of the citizens to the free enjoyment of 
their property lawfully acquired.”). 
 57 See Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874) (“It must be conceded that there are . . . rights 
in every free government beyond the control of the State.  A government which recognized no such 
rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the 
absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after 
all but a despotism.”). 
 58 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 59 See id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically 
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the 
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin 
with.”). 
 60 See infra Part III. 
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But while we need not answer the question now, it is worth noting that 
natural rights also suggest respecting digital property.  From a Lockeian 
perspective, e-mails, online posts, digital documents, and other data all derive 
from our labor creating them.61  From a Hegelian perspective, while we 
might not care deeply about our iPad and our Samsung Galaxy s10, we 
certainly care about their data.62  From a utilitarian perspective, respecting 
digital property rights encourages using online systems and creating new 
digital media. 
But, in the end, this Article does not seek to define digital property.  Other 
able authors have taken up that task repeatedly.  Rather, this Article asks 
what digital property the Constitution must respect. 
II.   LEGISLATIVE WINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL WINESKINS 
Though the Constitution looms large, it controls little.  It never mentions 
trusts and estates.  It passes upon bankruptcy63 and contracts64 in the briefest 
fashion.  And it only hints at property law.65 It explicitly references property 
rights66 in only two sections:  the Due Process Clauses67 and the Takings 
Clause.68  Courts and scholars have struggled to find a common definition of 
 
 61 See Donald Fishman, Reading John Locke in Cyberspace: Natural Rights and “The Commons” in a Digital Age, 
41 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 34, 41 (2004) (“To use Locke’s terminology, cyberspace is a ‘vast wilderness’ 
in which individuals can employ their labor to create new products and services.”). 
 62 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (“[I]t is no exaggeration to say that many of the 
more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of 
nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”). 
 63 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States[.]”). 
 64 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts . . . .”). 
 65 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (describing “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating 
that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law” and that 
private property shall not “be taken for public use without just compensation”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that no State shall deprive a person of life, liberty, or property). 
 66 Article IV references Congress’ authority to regulate territorial and other property, but that power 
bears no relation to this discussion.  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power 
to dispose of and make all needful Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States[.]”). 
 67 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 68 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
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“property” that gives force and effect to both clauses.  Indeed, in the most 
influential article on the subject, Thomas Merrill conceded that the Supreme 
Court has assigned different definitions to “property” depending on the 
clause where it appears.69 
At first, this seems incongruent.  But we should remember that just as the 
Constitution (mostly) does not regulate trusts, estates, bankruptcy, or 
contract, it neither recognizes nor regulates property itself.70  It does not 
separate public land from private land, a house from an apartment, or my 
car from yours.  Instead, as we discussed in the previous Part, positive law 
recognizes property rights.71  After those rights arise under positive law, the 
Constitution protects certain enumerated property rights, most notably 
persons, houses, papers, and effects.72 
But the Fourth Amendment’s protection neither recognizes nor requires 
magic labels.73  If a misguided postal worker created an ad campaign 
encouraging citizens to “feel at home at the post office,” the post office does 
not transform into a Fourth Amendment house.  By the same logic, if a town 
changed all its records to refer to residences as “public land,” they would not 
thereby lose the Constitution’s aegis.  Instead, the Constitution’s explicit 
 
 69 See Merrill, supra note 49, at 959 (“[I]t is desirable to have three separate patterning definitions of 
constitutional property, one each for procedural due process, takings law, and substantive due 
process.  These definitions would act as allocational devices, steering different types of claims 
involving government interference with economic interests to different bodies of constitutional 
doctrine.”). 
 70 See Stern, supra note 15, at 286 (“The Constitution directs its attention to certain actions that 
contravene rights established within the law of property, not to the underlying assets those rights 
concern.”). 
 71 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (“Because the Constitution protects 
rather than creates property interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference 
to ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” 
(quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
 72 See id.; see also Merrill, supra note 49, at 927 (“Federal constitutional law prescribes the set of criteria 
an interest must have to qualify as property; whether the claimant has an interest that fits the pattern 
is then determined by examining independent sources such as state law.”); cf.  United States v. 
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002) (internal citations omitted) (“A common idiom describes 
property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, 
constitute property.  State law determines only which sticks are in a person’s bundle.  Whether 
those sticks qualify as ‘property’ for purposes of the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal 
law.”); Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (“We look initially to state law to determine 
what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to 
determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ 
within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”). 
 73 Stern, supra note 15, at 286–87 (“The existence of a property right does not depend simply on 
whether some other body of law uses the term ‘property’ or declares that a person has a ‘property 
right.’  As with a number of areas of federal law that attach consequences to ‘property’ but do not 
purport to create property themselves, the Constitution’s property clauses call for a means of 
classifying the legal relationships that other legal sources create.”). 
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reference to property in the Takings and Due Process Clauses and its implied 
reference to property in the Fourth Amendment “implies a set of criteria for 
drawing lines between different kinds of rights, benefits, or statuses” 
conferred by positive law.74  If the law “create[s] a legal relationship satisfying 
those criteria, a person has a property right” that the Constitution protects.75 
 According to Professor Thomas Merrill, the Court recognizes three such 
legal relationships.  The narrowest criteria define property for the Takings 
Clause.  Here Merrill would ask “whether nonconstitutional sources of law 
confer an irrevocable right on the claimant to exclude others from specific 
assets.”76  The next narrowest criteria go to procedural due process, with its 
property differentiated by widening the definition from “assets” to 
“entitlements.”  Its “hallmark . . . is an individual entitlement grounded in 
state law, which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’”77  Finally, the widest 
(and squishiest) criteria go to property for substantive due process, the 
definition for which removes the “discrete assets” requirement entirely.78  
Merrill’s definitions have exerted enormous influence on jurists and scholars.  
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, both Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and 
Justice Stevens’ dissent cited Merrill with approval.79  Scholars have similarly 
found inspiration from Merrill’s work.80 
In the previous Part, this Article concluded that property rights arise from 
positive law at the time the rights vest.  We next seek to answer which 
 
 74 Id. at 287; see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005) (“We will not, of 
course, defer to the Tenth Circuit on the ultimate issue:  whether what Colorado law has given 
respondent constitutes a property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That 
determination, despite its state-law underpinnings, is ultimately one of federal constitutional law.”); 
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (“Although the underlying 
substantive interest is created by ‘an independent source such as state law,’ federal constitutional 
law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected 
by the Due Process Clause.” (quoting Bd.  of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972)). 
 75 Stern, supra note 15, at 287. 
 76 Merrill, supra note 49, at 969. 
 77 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water 
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1978)); see also Merrill, supra note 49, at 960–61 (identifying and 
making non-substantive changes to this test). 
 78 Merrill, supra note 49, at 983. 
 79 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional 
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 945 (2000)); see also id. at 791 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 964 n.289 (2000)). 
 80 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 583 n.273 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape 
of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 922 (2000)); see also M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of 
Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1423 n.133 (2004) (citing Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 892 (2000)); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb 
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine, 102 MICH.  L. REV. 689, 694 n.17 (2004) (citing Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 963–64, 987–88 (2000)). 
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property rights receive the Constitution’s protection.  We might feel tempted 
to repeat the Fourth Amendment refrain: persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.  After all, everyone understands those terms.  But do we really? Are 
shed skin cells part of my person?81  Does tenancy make it my house?82  Are 
e-mails my papers?83  The courts have tried to answer these questions, but 
they have done so through Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy lens.  
Property provides a more stable foundation. 
But to use property’s protections, we need to define constitutional 
property.  When I send an e-mail, does it belong to me, the recipient, my e-
mail provider, or every server operator in between?  E-mails are modern-day 
“papers,” but how do I know they are my papers? 
A.   The Right to Exclude 
The right to exclude provides a good place to start.  It is Merrill’s 
narrowest definition, so it is unlikely to over capture.  And as the Takings 
Clause definition, it relates directly to physical, tangible things, much like the 
Fourth Amendment’s persons, houses, papers, and effects. 
For the Framing Generation, the right to exclude was the quintessential 
property right.  As William Pitt proclaimed, even the humblest house owner 
could defy the King himself:  “The poorest man may in his cottage bid 
defiance to all the force of the crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
wind may blow through it; the storms may enter, the rain may enter—but 
the King of England cannot enter!”84 
Again and again, courts have identified the right to exclude as the central 
concept that underpins most property.  In College Savings Bank, the Supreme 
Court called it “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest[.]”85  In Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, it called the right to exclude “one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”86  
 
 81 See Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626 (Md. 2010) (answering the question in the negative under the 
Fourth Amendment); see also State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (finding the same). 
 82 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (answering the question in the affirmative under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 83 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (answering the question in the 
affirmative under the Fourth Amendment). 
 84 EDWARD LATHAM, FAMOUS SAYINGS AND THEIR AUTHORS 64 (2d ed.  1906). 
 85 Coll. Sav. Bk. v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999). 
 86 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 
374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 831 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176);Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176); see also United States v. 
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 283–84 (2002) (calling the right to exclude an “essential property right[]”). 
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It has even emphasized this point to identify intangible property rights like 
patents and trademarks.87 
The Court and its members have also cited the right to exclude as 
relevant to the Fourth Amendment.  In Rakas v. Illinois, the Court 
incorporated the right to exclude in its privacy analysis, noting that the 
expectation of privacy found in Katz and Jones derives partly from the ability 
to exclude others.88  In his Olmsted dissent, Justice Butler likewise suggested 
that  wiretap evidence should have been barred because “the exclusive use 
of the wire belongs to the persons served by it.”89  Thus, those users had at 
least some property right in it, insufficient to make them owners, but 
sufficient to exclude other callers or the police.  And Justice Stevens has 
explained that a property owner “has a right to exclude from it all the world,” 
and that government monitoring “infringes that exclusionary right.”90 
Scholars have reached the same conclusion as the courts.91  As Merrill 
recognized, though they may use different terminology, property theorists 
repeatedly centralize the right to exclude:   
 
 87 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“[T]he Patent Act also declares 
that ‘patents shall have the attributes of personal property,’ § 261, including ‘the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,’ § 154(a)(1).” (quoting 35 
U.S.C. §§ 154, 261)); see also Coll. Sav. Bk., 527 U.S. at 673 (“The Lanham Act may well contain 
provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable property interests—notably, its provisions 
dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the ‘property’ of the owner because he can 
exclude others from using them.”). 
 88 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978) (“Except with respect to his friend, Jones had 
complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it.  Likewise in 
Katz, the defendant occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude all others 
and paid the toll . . . .”). 
 89 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 487 (1928) (Butler, J., dissenting). 
 90 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The owner of property, of course, has a right to exclude from it all the world, including the 
Government, and a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own purposes.  When the 
Government attaches an electronic monitoring device to that property, it infringes that exclusionary 
right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the property to its own use.”); see also Soldal v. Cook 
County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (“A ‘seizure’ of property, we have explained, occurs when ‘there is 
some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” (quoting 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 
 91 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 371 (1954) (“Private 
property may or may not involve a right to use something oneself.  It may or may not involve a 
right to sell, but whatever else it involves, it must at least involve a right to exclude others from 
doing something.”); see also Pollack, supra note 25, at 107 (“[P]roperty rights are meant to 
protect . . . the right to exclude others and to control access.”); see also Stern, supra note 15, at 277 
(“[P]roperty is best understood as the right to have some measure of legal control over the way a 
particular item is used, control that comes at the expense of all other people.”); see also Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1828 (2009) (“The 
right to exclude others is the most fundamental component of ownership.”). 
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Whether one calls this the right to “determine how the object shall be used 
and by whom,” or a “right to exclude others from things which is grounded 
by the interest we have in the use of things,” or the right of “direct trespassory 
protection,” or the “gatekeeper” right, this conclusion has been 
independently reached over and over again.92 
B.   From Specific Objects 
In addition to the specific right at issue—the right to exclude—we must 
consider to which objects this right attaches.  Property requires in rem rights, 
not merely in personam rights.93  Though the merits of this distinction have 
been debated, some dividing line is universally acknowledged.94  In rem rights 
have two distinct features:  (1) they pertain to a res, a particular thing;95 (2) 
they avail against the world entire.96  The type of property does not matter.  
The Constitution extends to both real and personal property.97  It protects 
both tangible and intangible property.98 
 
 92 Merrill, supra note 49, at 971. 
 93 Stern, supra note 15, at 296 (“[R]ights in rem are property rights, while rights in personam are rights 
that are not property rights.”). 
 94 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
773, 780 (2001) (“Both civil law and common law jurisdictions have long recognized that certain 
legal rights are good ‘against the world’ while others apply only against named persons or entities.  
This distinction, which has long endured across different legal systems, cannot be dismissed as arid 
conceptualism or as a matter of attaching arbitrary labels to underlying phenomena that are really 
the same.”); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 
2058 (2004) (“[P]roperty rights run with the object, and can be contrasted with contract rights, 
which bind only parties in privity.”). 
 95 See Stern, supra note 15, at 297 (“A property right, a right in rem, is centrally concerned with some 
particular, singular, discrete thing—a res.”). 
 96 See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004) (“A bankruptcy court’s in 
rem jurisdiction permits it to ‘determin[e] all claims that anyone, whether named in the action or 
not, has to the property or thing in question.  The proceeding is ‘one against the world.’” (citations 
omitted)); see also Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929) (“A judgment in rem 
binds all the world . . . .”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 533 (“[I]n contrast to contractual 
rights that avail only against other parties to an agreement, property rights avail against the rest of 
the world, irrespective of consent.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 777 (“Property rights . . . are 
in rem—they bind ‘the rest of the world.’”); Schwartz, supra note 94 at 2058 (“[T]his Article defines 
property as any interest in an object, whether tangible or intangible, that is enforceable against the 
world.”); Stern, supra note 15, at 292 (“[P]roperty rights assume a distinctive form:  they pertain to 
specific things and they are ‘good against the world.’”). 
 97 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (“Nothing in the text or history of the 
Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different [from real property] when 
it comes to the appropriation of personal property.  The Government has a categorical duty to pay 
just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home.”). 
 98 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) (protecting trade secrets with the 
Takings Clause); Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 782 (“[I]n rem rights are not necessarily related 
to a thing, in the sense of a tangible object.  Such rights can also exist in intangibles, such as 
intellectual property.”). 
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This requirement for property and rights availing “against the world” 
makes particular sense in the Fourth Amendment context.  Obviously, no 
one contracts in advance with the Government, demanding it keep out from 
our houses.  Nor would anyone expect us to exclude the Government from 
places open to the general public.  But where the world must respect our 
rights, the Government must do the same. 
In Parts III and IV, this Article will further consider whether the rights 
granted by statute for specific digital objects fall in personam or in rem. 
C.   Existing Property Precedent 
Existing precedent generally accords with the idea that an exclusion right 
triggers Fourth Amendment property protection.  Jones had the right to keep 
trackers off his Jeep.99  Jardines could bar unwelcome visitors from his 
yard.100  Silverman could shoo snoops away from his heating ducts.101 
This approach does create notable problems in one precedential area:  
open fields.  Well before Katz, Hester v. United States permitted Prohibition 
officers to trespass “fifty to one hundred yards away” from the house.102  It 
held that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to open fields.103  After 
deciding Katz, the Supreme Court again considered the issue, this time 
refusing to exclude marihuana found growing on defendant’s land, “over a 
mile from [his] home.”104  The Court grounded its analysis principally in the 
lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy.105  But the Court seemed to go 
out of its way to denigrate the property approach, calling property rights “but 
one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are 
legitimate.”106  Obviously this abandonment of the property approach has 
 
 99 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that the attachment of a GPS device to a 
vehicle without a warrant was a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 100 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (holding that the use of drug-sniffing dog by law 
enforcement on a front porch was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
 101 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding that attaching a microphone to a 
house’s heating duct was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment). 
 102 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924). 
 103 See id. at 59 (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect open fields). 
 104 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
 105 See id.  at 180 (“[N]o expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.”). 
 106 Id.  at 183. 
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been itself abandoned or at least reinterpreted by Jones107 and Jardines.108  
Nonetheless, in deciding Oliver, the Court holds clearly that open fields are 
neither “houses”109 nor “effects” as the Framers would have understood 
them.110 
This creates tension with our proposed rule, which suggests a Fourth 
Amendment property right whenever an owner may exclude others.  The 
obvious answer restates our rule to incorporate the Fourth Amendment’s 
textual limitations:  A Fourth Amendment property right arises when an owner may 
generally exclude others from a person, house, paper, or effect. 
This reconciles our rule with precedent, but seems unsatisfying.  On the 
one hand, grounding our analysis in the Constitution’s text always provides 
a useful focus.  In writing, ratifying, and following that governing document 
for more than two centuries, we have made a social compact, reaffirmed each 
time we hew to its text.  And a textual approach checks the understandable 
though misguided urge for judicial opinion or scholarly theory to create 
rights untethered from that compact.  Yet when advancing a Fourth 
Amendment theory based on property rights, this leaves a gaping hole in that 
theory. 
Open fields precedent undermines not merely property rights, but 
equality before the law.111  A trespassing citizen merits arrest.  When the 
Government trespasses without consequence, as it did in Oliver, Government 
officers set themselves above the law.112  This Article does not offer a 
 
 107 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not 
rise or fall with the Katz formulation. . . . As explained, for most of our history the Fourth 
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the 
areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.  Katz did not repudiate that 
understanding.”). 
 108 See Florida v.  Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (“The Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has been 
added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 
and so is unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by physically intruding on 
constitutionally protected areas.” (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 409)).   
 109 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 (“The distinction between [open fields] and the house is as old as the 
common law.” (quoting Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.  57, 59 (1924))). 
 110 See id. at 177 (explaining that Madison replaced “other property” with “effects” during drafting, 
which “broadened the scope of the Amendment in some respects,” but “cannot be said to 
encompass open fields”). 
 111 See Baude & Stern, supra note 21, at 1847 (“[T]he very term ‘rule of law’ was coined by A.V. Dicey 
to capture the idea of a political system in which ‘no man is above the law,’ meaning in particular 
that it ‘excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the 
law which governs other citizens.’  To place officials above the law would be to subvert this 
fundamental principle of political liberty.”). 
 112 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 194–95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[A] deliberate entry by a private citizen 
onto private property marked with ‘No Trespassing’ signs will expose him to criminal liability.  I 
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satisfying conclusion to this conundrum.  Perhaps the proper route uses 
Article V to expand the property definition.  Other authors suggest that any 
breach of positive law—trespassing, for example—should trigger the Fourth 
Amendment.113  
Fourth Amendment property may sweep more broadly than the right to 
exclude suggested under the Takings Clause.  But these definitions nest, so 
any property protected by the Takings Clause will receive Fourth 
Amendment protection.  Because this Article argues that traditional property 
definitions grant Fourth Amendment protections to digital data right now, the 
remainder will assume arguendo that we must satisfy the narrower, more 
well-established Takings property definition.  But should that proposition 
find acceptance, the outer boundaries of Fourth Amendment property merit 
further investigation. 
III.   THEORIES OF EXCLUSION:  COPYRIGHT, THE CFAA, THE SCA, AND 
PRIVACY LAWS 
When positive law recognizes a right to exclude, the Constitution treats 
it as a property right.  We must next ask which positive law might grant a 
right to exclude others from our digital data, even when held by third parties.  
At least four statutory schemes come to mind:  copyright law, state privacy 
laws, the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the federal Stored 
Communications Act.  Each recognizes at least some right to control digital 
data even when held by others. 
A.   Copyright 
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”114  Every document, e-mail, photo, and 
 
see no reason why a government official should not be obliged to respect such unequivocal and 
universally understood manifestations of a landowner’s desire for privacy.”). 
 113 See generally, Baude & Stern, supra note 21 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment should use 
positive law as its baseline). 
 114 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
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other original work gets copyright protection115 simply by its creation.116  And 
with that copyright come six exclusive rights automatically assigned to the 
creator:  (1) reproducing the copyrighted work, (2) preparing derivative 
works, (3) distributing copies, (4) performing the copyrighted work, (5) 
displaying the copyrighted work, and (6) transmitting the copyrighted 
work.117 
 Copyrights seem to grant the right to exclude what we are seeking.  They 
apply to digital “papers,” they refer to a specific thing, they provide “the right 
to exclude others[,]”118 and they avail against the entire world entire.119  But 
there is a problem.  Several, actually.  And they all stem from the same root:  
copyright does not principally protect individual rights.120  Rather, as the 
Constitution makes plain, it “promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”121  We should not confuse the path with the destination.122  Copyright 
law “secur[es] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
 
 115 The work must satisfy the originality, authorship, and fixation requirements.  But the law draws 
these concepts broadly.  Originality “means only that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree 
of creativity.” Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  Authorship 
requires only that the work involve human creativity, any method “by which the ideas in the mind 
of the author are given visible expression.” Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 
58 (1884).  Fixation includes even representations in temporary memory like RAM.  See MAI Sys. 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).   
 116 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2018) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists 
from its creation . . . .”). 
 117 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).  Performance, distribution, and transmission apply only to certain types 
of works.  For example, transmission applies “in the case of sound recordings” and grants the right 
to “perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” Id. § 106. 
 118 eBay Inc.  v.  MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“Like a patent owner, a copyright 
holder possesses ‘the right to exclude others from using his property.’” (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. 
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))). 
 119 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A copyright is a right against 
the world.”); see also Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 431 
(2d Cir. 2012) (emphasizing the same principle); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334, 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (following the reasoning of ProCD); Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1155 (“A true 
intellectual property right provides the owner with rights to exclude that are good against the world 
at large as to innovations that are generally widely distributed to the public.”). 
 120 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly 
privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a 
special private benefit.”). 
 121 U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 122 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (“We have often recognized the monopoly 
privileges Congress has authorized, while ‘intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the 
public good.” (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429)); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.”). 
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to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”123  But it does so as a 
mechanism for advancing a deeper commitment, “enriching the general 
public through access to creative works.”124 
To that end, Congress limited copyright in two substantial ways: First, it 
required that copyright registrants deposit their works with the Copyright 
Office, facilitating public access upon copyright expiration.125 Second, 
Congress built statutory safe harbors from infringement claims, like fair 
use.126 Both provisions are inconsistent with a right to exclude that we should 
deem a Fourth Amendment property right. 
Though copyright attaches upon creation, the ability to enforce that 
copyright comes only with registration.127  And registration requires 
depositing the work with the Copyright Office.128  This deposit requirement 
has existed in one form or another since 1790.129  Through the deposit 
requirement, the Library of Congress receives and can make available any 
 
 123 U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 124 Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527. 
 125 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 (“[Copyright] is intended . . . to allow the public access to the 
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”). 
 126 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“From the infancy of copyright 
protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to 
fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”) (quoting 
U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 127 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2018) (“Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the 
author under section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no civil action for 
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”); see also Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010) (“Subject to certain exceptions, the Copyright 
Act (Act) requires copyright holders to register their works before suing for copyright 
infringement.”). 
 128 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2018) (mandating deposit for registration). 
 129 See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (“No action or proceeding shall be 
maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this Act with respect 
to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with.”); see also Act 
of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 90, 16 Stat. 198, 213 (“[N]o person shall be entitled to a copyright unless 
he shall . . . deposit in the mail a printed copy of the title of the book or other article . . . .”); see also 
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (“[N]o person shall be entitled to the benefit of 
this act . . . unless he shall first deposit . . . a printed copy of the title of such map, chart, book or 
books . . . .”); see also John B. Koegel, Bamboozlement:  The Repeal of Copyright Registration Incentives, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 529, 529–31 (1995) (discussing history of the Hughes Repeal Bill, 
which repealed registration incentives); see also Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice, Deposit 
and Registration:  The Importance of Being Formal, 24 UCLA. L. REV. 1232, 1253 (1977) (“The 
requirement that an author must, as a precondition to the full benefits of copyright, register his 
claim and deposit his work with a designated public official antedates American copyright law and 
has been a part of every copyright law enacted in this country.”). 
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work seeking copyright.130  Former Librarian of Congress James H. 
Billington testified that these deposits have served to build “the world’s most 
comprehensive collections in all formats, used by scholars every day and 
available to all comers.”131  Mandatory deposit accomplishes copyright’s goal 
to serve the public good by making government and public access a 
requirement for copyright’s exclusionary power.  In a similar way, fair use 
serves the public good by permitting laudable uses for the copyrighted work 
even over the copyright holder’s objection. 
Now codified by statute, fair use permits third parties to override a 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights “for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, [and] research.”132  So long as 
their use is reasonable—as determined by a multi-factor test including 
elements like commercial or non-profit use—then it is “not an infringement 
of copyright.”133  Fair use actually encourages new authorship by permitting 
prior protected works to form the inspiration and foundation for new 
works.134  For that reason, “[f]rom the infancy of copyright protection,” fair 
use was “thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”135  
Both these limits—fair use and mandatory deposit—demonstrate that 
while the copyright law provides a right to exclude, it is not the type of right 
to exclude necessary to support Fourth Amendment protections.  Requiring 
that the accused turn over property to the government seems inconsistent 
with giving the accused the right not to turn over property to the government.  
And giving third-party document holders the right to copy the documents 
 
 130 See Koegel, supra note 129, at 533–34 (“[S]ection 411(a) is said to produce three benefits:  it provides 
an incentive (1) to register and (2) to deposit works that are passed along to the Library of Congress, 
and (3) it establishes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright.”). 
 131 Copyright Reform Act of 1993:  Hearings on H.R. 897 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial 
Admin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 182 (statement of James H. 
Billington, Librarian of Congress); see also Levine & Squires, supra note 129, at 1254 (“By requiring 
deposit in the Library of Congress of a copy or copies of any work in which statutory copyright is 
claimed, the copyright law has fostered the development and growth of a national collection of this 
country’s creative product and culture.”). 
 132 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
 133 Id. § 107. 
 134 See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (“In truth, in literature, 
in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are 
strictly new and original throughout.  Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must 
necessarily borrew [sic], and use much which was well known and used before.”).   
 135 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8). 
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when such copying serves the public interest—such as by sending them to 
law enforcement—likewise fails to “secure . . . houses, papers, and effects.”136 
B.   Privacy Laws 
State privacy laws seem more likely to create property rights in digital 
data.  Professor William Prosser’s traditional privacy torts bar intrusion upon 
seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light, and 
appropriation of name or likeness.137  The first three create no property 
rights.  Intrusion upon seclusion punishes the intrusion,138 but does not create 
a right that travels with the information obtained.139  Neither public 
disclosure140 nor false light141 offer any durable right to exclude.  They 
prevent only public disclosure, not possession or private disclosure.142  Only 
appropriation143 might be considered a property right.144  But a right 
carefully circumscribed to name and likeness provides no real benefit in the 
Fourth Amendment context. 
Data breach laws more broadly cover all personal information.  
Pennsylvania uses a typical definition: 
 
 136 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 137 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (listing torts pertaining to privacy). 
 138 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”). 
 139 See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (refusing to extend intrusion upon 
seclusion to news professionals who merely received and publicized information that was wrongfully 
obtained). 
 140 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who gives publicity 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) 
is not of legitimate concern to the public.”). 
 141 See id. § 652E (“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before 
the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false 
light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the 
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and 
the false light in which the other would be placed.”). 
 142 There is also some question about these torts pointing to a specific thing.  While I do not think a res 
needs a specific document—intellectual property has never required this—I do think it needs 
specifically quantifiable data.  Names, addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, etc. are 
all specifically quantifiable.  But a jury must assess private facts and false light on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 143 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who appropriates 
to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy.”). 
 144 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 33 (6th ed. 2018) (“The 
appropriation tort is akin to a property right . . . .”). 
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An individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with 
and linked to any one or more of the following data elements when the data 
elements are not encrypted or redacted: 
(i) Social Security number. 
(ii) Driver’s license number or a State identification card number issued 
in lieu of a driver’s license. 
(iii) Financial account number, credit or debit card number, in 
combination with any required security code, access code or password 
that would permit access to an individual’s financial account.145 
But Pennsylvania—like other states—provides no private right of action 
to enforce its statute.146  More importantly, it provides no right to exclude.  
It neither prohibits companies from possessing data nor from sharing it with 
others.  It doesn’t even punish breaches (or failure to provide adequate 
security to prevent them).  It only punishes a failure to notify when a breach 
occurs.147 
This laissez faire attitude is common in the United States.  Indeed, it 
traditionally differentiates European law from U.S. law.  European law 
focuses on a right to respect and personal dignity that includes controlling 
one’s own information, even when it leaves a person’s hands.148  The 
European General Data Protection Regulation (“the GDPR”) embodies this 
approach.  The GDPR imposes obligations on anyone controlling149 or 
 
 145 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2006). 
 146 See id. § 2308 (“The Office of Attorney General shall have exclusive authority to bring an action 
under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law for a violation of this act.”); see 
also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(6)(a) (McKinney 2019) (“[W]henever the attorney general shall 
believe . . . that there is a violation of this article he or she may bring an action in the name and on 
behalf of the people of the state of New York . . . .”).  But see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2019) 
(permitting private actions). 
 147 See 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2303 (West 2006) (“An entity that maintains, stores or 
manages computerized data that includes personal information shall provide notice of any breach 
of the security of the system following discovery of the breach of the security of the system to any 
resident of this Commonwealth whose unencrypted and unredacted personal information was or is 
reasonably believed to have been accessed and acquired by an unauthorized person.”). 
 148 See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 
1151, 1161 (2004) (“Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a form of protection of a 
right to respect and personal dignity.  The core continental privacy rights are rights to one’s image, name, 
and reputation, and what Germans call the right to informational self-determination—the right to control 
the sorts of information disclosed about oneself.”). 
 149 See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), art. 4(7), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33 (EU) (“‘[C]ontroller’ means the natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or other body which . . . determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data . . . .”). 
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processing personal data.150  These obligations include the subject’s right to 
access,151 correct,152 and delete153 his or her data.  Importantly, any entity 
that controls or processes data becomes subject to the GDPR.154  The right 
follows the data.   
In the United States, we have traditionally focused on freedom from State 
intrusion.155  Even as corporations like Google and others vacuum up vast 
personal information, we remain curiously unengaged.  In fairness, this 
seeming negligence likely has at least some roots in our enduring respect for 
contract rights.  After all, unwise as it might be, users click and consent to 
contracts granting companies broad powers over our data.  Whatever the 
motivation, our myopic focus on State power has ironically left us more 
vulnerable to the State.  As information becomes available to these 
companies, the third-party rule makes it available to the State.  More and 
more we live less and less of our lives free from the Government’s view. 
But the U.S. emphasis on contractual rights over inherent privacy 
protections may be shifting.  In 2018, the California Consumer Privacy Act 
(“the CCPA”) became law.156  It took effect in 2020.157  It is by far the most 
comprehensive data privacy law in the United States, though less far-
reaching than the GDPR.158  Among its limitations, the CCPA confines itself 
to personal data from California residents.159  It also limits the consumer to 
“request[ing] that a business delete any personal information about the 
consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”160  The right appears 
far from absolute, and essentially in personam, directed at the relationship 
between business and customer, not the data itself. 
But at least some rights appear to travel with the data.  For example, the 
CCPA grants the consumer an absolute right to bar a data collector from 
 
 150 See id. art. 4(8) (“‘[P]rocessor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller[.]”). 
 151 See id. art. 15 (protecting the right to access to one’s personal data). 
 152 See id. art. 16 (protecting the right to correct one’s personal data). 
 153 See id. art. 17 (protecting the right to delete one’s personal data). 
 154 See id. arts. 4(7)–4(8) (defining “controller” and “processor,” respectively). 
 155 See Whitman, supra note 148, at 1161 (“At its conceptual core, the American right to privacy still 
takes much the form that it took in the eighteenth century:  It is the right to freedom from intrusions 
by the state, especially in one’s own home.”). 
 156 See Carol A.F. Umhoefer & Tracy Shapiro, CCPA vs.  GDPR:  The Same, Only Different, DLA PIPER 
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/04/ipt-news-q1-
2019/ccpa-vs-gdpr/ (comparing California’s Consumer Privacy Act with the GDPR). 
 157 See id. 
 158 See id. (“In some respects, however, the CCPA does not go as far as GDPR.”). 
 159 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g) (West 2020) (“‘Consumer’ means a natural person who is a 
California resident . . . .”). 
 160 See id. § 1798.105(a) (emphasis added). 
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selling the consumer’s data.161  Third parties that obtain or currently hold a 
consumer’s data must ensure they have consent before they can sell it.162  But 
it appears consumers cannot sue when businesses violate this section.163  The 
statute only provides a private right of action for failing to reasonably prevent 
data breaches.164  That action does appear to travel with the data.165  It does 
not limit itself to businesses receiving their data from the consumer.166 
Are these property rights?  It seems unlikely.  They include only a 
carefully constrained right to reasonable security against data breaches.  The 
more elaborate rights are not privately enforceable.  For the time being, 
privacy law fails to offer the right to exclude necessary to create a true 
property right.  But if privacy laws continue in this direction, it seems only a 
matter of time. 
C.   The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
For over 30 years, the federal government has used the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“the CFAA”) as its primary statutory tool for combating 
cybercrime.  Enacted in 1984, the CFAA was originally a narrow statute 
designed to criminalize access to computers in which the federal government 
had a substantial interest.167  But with successive changes over time, a statute 
that originally barred hacking into sensitive government computers or 
 
 161 See id. § 1798.120(a) (“A consumer shall have the right, at any time, to direct a business that sells 
personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell the consumer’s personal 
information.  This may be referred to as the right to opt-out.”). 
 162 See id. § 1798.115(d) (“A third party shall not sell personal information about a consumer that has 
been sold to the third party by a business unless the consumer has received explicit notice and is 
provided an opportunity to exercise the right to opt-out pursuant to Section 1798.120.”). 
 163 See David Stauss, CCPA:  Bill to Expand Private Right of Action Fails, JD SUPRA (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ccpa-bill-to-expand-private-right-of-65974/ (“The current 
version of the CCPA only allows individual consumers to sue for certain types of data breaches and 
leaves enforcement of the CCPA’s privacy-related rights to the California Attorney General’s 
Office.”). 
 164 See id. (“[T]he CCPA allows consumers to seek statutory damages . . . for data breaches due to a 
business’s failure to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices.”); see 
generally CIV.  CODE § 1798.150 (authorizing data breach actions). 
 165 See CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (“Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal 
information . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result 
of the business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures 
and practices . . . may institute a civil action . . . .”). 
 166 See generally id.  
 167 See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 
2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (making punishable unauthorized access to information on 
computers “determined by the United States Government . . . to require protection against 
unauthorized disclosure”). 
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centralized financial databases now federally criminalizes all hacking.168  
This includes hacking where the target computer resides on the same street, 
on the same floor, or even in the same room as the hacker, so long as the 
target is connected to the Internet.169  The statute also gives private parties 
the ability to enforce its terms through civil suits.170 
The CFAA punishes whoever “intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access.”171  In its wisdom, Congress 
never defined “authorization.”172  But though courts and scholars have 
propounded four or more theories for authorization,173 this split need not 
trouble us.  The theories disagree on presumption (access or denial), method 
(implicit or explicit), and clarity (code-based, contract-based, or other).174  
But all the theories agree that the system owner must somehow authorize the 
access.175  And thus all the theories provide a right to exclude. 
As we have conceived property rights, the CFAA thus seems plainly to 
grant a property right.  And that accords well with courts and scholars, which 
have treated the CFAA as enforcing a property-centered anti-trespass 
 
 168 See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 
(2010) (“The statute, originally designed to criminalize only important federal interest computer 
crimes, potentially regulates every use of every computer in the United States and even many 
millions of computers abroad.”). 
 169 Subsequent amendment expanded the “protected computer” definition yet again, now reaching 
any computer even “affecting” interstate commerce.  See id. at 1569–71 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2010)).  Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this would likely reach every computer, 
even those lacking any Internet connection.  See id.  (stating that the amendments make it likely that 
the statute “does not merely cover computers connected to the Internet that are actually ‘used’ in 
interstate commerce.  Instead, it applies to all computers, period, so long as the federal government 
has the power to regulate them.”).  But given the Internet’s modern ubiquity, this may mean a legal 
distinction without practical difference. 
 170 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2018).  
 171 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).  Similar language appears throughout the statute, but (a)(2) is the broadest 
and most frequently charged provision.  See Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fixing-the-worst-law-in-
technology (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(c) as “the broadest provision”). 
 172 See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Congress did 
not define the phrase ‘without authorization,’ perhaps assuming that the words speak for 
themselves.  The meaning, however, has proven to be elusive.”). 
 173 See Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1445 (2016) (“[T]he caselaw reflects at least five different 
interpretive paradigms.”); see also Kelsey T. Patterson, Narrowing It Down to One Narrow View:  Clarifying 
and Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 489, 492 (2013) (giving the four 
differing approaches circuit courts have used:  “agency-based, broad contract-based, code-based, 
and narrow contract-based”). 
 174 See Michael J. O’Connor, The Common Law of Cyber-Trespass, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 421, 427–447 
(2020) (organizing and categorizing approaches).   
 175 See id. (discussing this requirement in each theory). 
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right.176  But two objections suggest themselves:  the problem with third-party 
enforcement and the statute’s law enforcement exception. 
1.   Third-Party CFAA Enforcement 
As a computer hacking statute, one might assume that the CFAA protects 
computers, not computer documents.  By that logic, its right to exclude 
extends to the computer owner, not the document owner.  In other words, 
Google can enforce it, not the Gmail user.  But all the caselaw thus far 
disagrees. 
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, a civil litigant “used a ‘patently unlawful’ 
subpoena to gain access to e-mail stored by [the opposing parties’] Internet 
service provider.”177  When the opposing parties learned that the ISP had 
turned over their e-mails without notice from either the litigant or the ISP, 
they sued under the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.178  The district court dismissed the CFAA 
claim “on the theory that the Act does not apply to unauthorized access of a 
third party’s computer.”179  But the Ninth Circuit held this was error and 
that the CFAA extends to third-party computers: 
The district court erred by reading an ownership or control requirement into 
the Act.  The civil remedy extends to “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss 
by reason of a violation of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (emphasis 
added). . . . Individuals other than the computer’s owner may be 
proximately harmed by unauthorized access, particularly if they have rights 
to data stored on it.180 
District courts across three other circuits have also addressed the point, and 
unanimously agree with Theofel that third-party computer ownership poses 
 
 176 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The CFAA 
prohibits acts of computer trespass by those who are not authorized users or who exceed authorized 
use.”); United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Congress enacted the CFAA in 
1984 to address ‘computer crime,’ which was then principally understood as ‘hacking’ or trespassing 
into computer systems or data.”); Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime 
of Hacking, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1478 (2016) (“The text, structure, and history of the 
CFAA all indicate that its ‘without authorization’ term incorporates preexisting physical trespass 
rules.”); Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2016) 
(“[C]oncepts of authorization rest on trespass norms.”); O’Connor, supra note 174 at 422–23 
(agreeing that trespass norms can be used to resolve CFAA authorization). 
 177 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 178 See id. at 1071–72 (giving background on cause of action). 
 179 Id.  at 1078. 
 180 Id. 
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no obstacle to a CFAA claim.181  Thus, it appears that document owners can 
exercise the CFAA’s right to exclude even when hosting documents on 
servers owned by others. 
2.   The Law Enforcement Exemption and Unconstitutional Conditions 
One might also object to inferring a broad right to exclude from the 
CFAA because the statute exempts law enforcement.182  (Privacy laws 
contain similar exceptions, and similar objections arise there.)  But when the 
Government grants a property right, exempting itself from that property 
right seems unconstitutional. 
Imagine a similar scenario in the physical world.  The Government wants 
to sell public land for private homes, as it has done many times in the past.183  
But the land runs adjacent to a sensitive wildlife area.  The sale thus 
engenders massive opposition from environmental groups.  To assuage their 
concerns, the Government inserts a condition into the deeds for the sale:  
buyers waive the warrant requirement and consent to any “environmental 
inspection” of their land, including their house and curtilage.  This scenario 
would horrify the Framers, living in a time when the country retained vast 
public land, ready for taming by citizens. 
The Framers’ discontent finds jurisprudential purchase in the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  Speaking for the Court, Justice Stewart 
explained the doctrine thus:  
[E]ven though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit 
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number 
of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.  
 
 181 See, e.g., Phillips Med. Sys. P.R., Inc. v. GIS Partners Corp., 203 F. Supp. 3d 221, 230 (D.P.R. 2016) 
(“Moreover, ‘[i]ndividuals other than the computer’s owner’ may bring an action under the CFAA 
because they ‘may be proximately harmed by unauthorized access, particularly if they have rights to data 
stored on [the computer],’” (quoting Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis 
added))); Oce N. Am., Inc. v. MCS Services, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 481, 487 (D. Md. 2010) (“Plaintiff 
correctly cites to Theofel v. Farey-Jones for the proposition that it does not need to own the ‘protected 
computer’ in order to claim damages for a violation of the CFAA . . . .”); Nexans Wires S.A. v. 
Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 472–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that confidential document 
owner could enforce CFAA when stolen documents were stored on business partner’s server, but 
finding loss insufficient to trigger CFAA private-action threshold), aff’d, 166 F. App’x 559 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
 182 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f) (2018) (“This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, 
protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United States, a State, or a 
political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of the United States.”). 
 183 See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (providing a method for citizens 
to buy public lands). 
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It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests . . . .184 
Some question whether a unified unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
exists.  Professor Cass Sunstein views the prohibition on such conditions as a 
subsidiary element to the specific right at issue.185  Rather than trying to 
create a unified theory around unconstitutional conditions, he would direct 
attention to the constitutional right that the condition seeks to abridge.186  He 
would determine whether the condition “makes the particular burden a 
constitutionally troublesome one, and, if so, whether the government has 
available to it—because of the setting—distinctive justifications that make its 
action permissible.”187 
Applying Sunstein’s standard, the government’s CFAA exemption 
plainly crosses the line.  From the country’s inception, the government has 
routinely recognized new property rights.  Patents and copyrights were 
sought and issued, currency and bonds printed and distributed, and public 
land carved up and sold into private hands.  In each case, the government 
recognized the constitutional limitations granted alongside that property 
right.  Patents and copyrights cannot be revoked without due process,188 
federal bonds cannot be taxed by the states,189 and private property cannot 
be searched without a warrant.190 
 
 184 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R.  
Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926) (“[A]s a general rule, the state, having power to deny a 
privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose.  But the power of the 
state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions 
which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.  If the state may compel the surrender of 
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all.  
It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be 
manipulated out of existence.”). 
 185 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 
338 (1989) (“Whether a condition is permissible is a function of the particular constitutional 
provision at issue; on that score, anything so general as an unconstitutional conditions doctrine is 
likely to be quite unhelpful.”). 
 186 See id. at 344 (“[U]nconstitutional conditions problems require a quite particular analysis of the 
nature of the relevant right.”). 
 187 Id. at 345.  
 188 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bk., 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999) 
(“Patents . . . have long been considered a species of property. . . . As such, they are surely included 
within the ‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process of law.”). 
 189 See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 469 (1829) (“The tax on government 
stock is thought by this Court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on 
the credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the [C]onstitution.”). 
 190 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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But perhaps some unifying principle exists around unconstitutional 
conditions, as scholars like Professor Richard Epstein have suggested.191  As 
an initial gating mechanism, the doctrine only applies when the Government 
attempts to bypass constitutional prohibitions “by obtaining bargained-for 
consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted.”192  Without that 
consent, we need not even consider unconstitutional conditions.  Here the 
Government did not obtain individualized consent from computer owners to 
bypass the CFAA’s authorization requirement.  Thus we return to regular 
constitutional order, where the Government cannot merely use its 
“monopoly of force” to overcome objections.193  The Fourth Amendment’s 
bargain remains intact, and access requires a warrant. 
But let us assume that we can imply some consent.  The Government 
need not have extended this property right under the CFAA in the first place.  
By seeking to enforce this property right against the Government that wants 
to access our files without a warrant, we could be seen to consent to the 
government’s law enforcement carveout.  At this point, we turn to the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine proper.  Professor Epstein views the 
doctrine as an outgrowth of common-law guarantees like duress and 
misrepresentation, which ensure full, free, and fair consent before holding 
contractual promises binding.194 
Protecting consent normally protects liberty.195  But Professor Epstein 
posits that sometimes consent’s one-to-one bargaining process breaks down 
society’s bargaining ability.  He uses voting rights as a noteworthy example:  
“Voting rights, for example, may be of little value to any given individual, 
who would surrender them gladly for a right to do business on public 
highways.  If many individuals did so, the combined effect would be to ensure 
a structural tyranny and the loss of many other liberties.”196  He identifies 
three areas where the interaction between individual choice and government 
 
 191 See generally, Richard A.  Epstein, Foreword:  Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV.  4 (1988) (providing a framework to understand unconstitutional 
conditions and showing its operation in a variety of contexts). 
 192 Id. at 7. 
 193 See id. at 102 (“When the government uses only its monopoly of force to achieve its ends, classic 
constitutional questions arise under particular constitutional provisions.”). 
 194 See id. at 8 (“Duress, force, misrepresentation, undue influence, and incompetence may be used to 
set aside contracts that otherwise meet the normal requirements of offer, acceptance, consideration, 
and consent.”). 
 195 Cf. LOCKE, supra note 28, at 269 (“Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and 
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, 
without his own consent.”). 
 196 Epstein, supra note 191, at 54. 
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pressure creates problems: monopoly, collective action dilemmas, and 
externalities.197  Of these, monopoly seems most relevant to our discussion. 
Monopoly arises where “the market has a single seller who can set terms 
for sale that maximize his own profits.”198  The Supreme Court confronted 
the monopoly strain of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in cases 
where states discriminated against out-of-state companies by leveraging the 
state’s exclusive power to license corporations.  The Court held that the State 
could not burden out-of-state companies with a tax it declined to impose on 
in-state companies.199  As with recognizing corporations, the Government 
likewise has a monopoly in recognizing private property rights.  Whether 
justified by natural or positive law, without government recognition, private 
property rights have no force behind them.200  Government would likely 
prefer to recognize constitutional protections for persons and houses—if only 
to avoid the same Revolutionary misfortune that befell our previous 
government—but withhold such protections for other property rights.  But 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine puts the Government to the difficult 
choice:  recognize all or recognize none.  Since we plainly recognize 
constitutional protections for other property rights, the Government must 
recognize them here.201 
The CFAA grants a right to exclude, both to system owners and to system 
users with confidential documents.  Because the Government cannot 
legitimately carve itself an exemption from the Fourth Amendment 
protections applicable to all property, the CFAA should effectively extend 
Fourth Amendment protections to digital documents even when hosted on 
third-party systems. 
 
 197 See id. at 102 (“[T]he traditional norms prohibiting coercion and duress are insufficient to police the 
legal monopoly that government exercises over certain critical domains.  As a matter of general 
theory, the emphasis must shift from transactional to institutional justice, at which point three 
problems become paramount:  monopoly, collective action dilemmas, and externalities.”). 
 198 Id. at 16. 
 199 See S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910) (“We hold, therefore, that to tax the foreign 
corporation for carrying on business under the circumstances shown, by a different and much more 
onerous rule than is used in taxing domestic corporations for the same privilege, is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws . . . .”). 
 200 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR  THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-WEALTH 
ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL 105 (1651) (“If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties 
performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of 
Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd:  But if there be 
a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is 
not Voyd.”). 
 201 See Epstein, supra note 191, at 38 (“If forced to choose between exclusion and admission on equal 
terms, the states do the latter . . . .”). 
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D.   The Stored Communications Act 
The Stored Communications Act ("the SCA”) prevents companies that 
publicly offer communication or computing services from sharing the data 
provided by their users.202  This prohibition comes riven with exceptions.  
Among others, it only restricts providers offering services to the public.203  
And even public providers can share data for multiple reasons.204  But where 
the right applies, subscribers may individually enforce it by civil action.205 
As with privacy laws and the CFAA, law enforcement exceptions exist.  
Strangely, though, the Stored Communications Act sometimes turns these 
exceptions on their head.  Often, the SCA restricts a provider more when it 
comes to disclosing data to the Government.  For example, providers can 
disclose metadata “to any person other than a governmental entity.”206  But 
the Stored Communications Act includes no exclusionary rule.207  If the 
provider can share the data with a third party but not the Government, does 
the Constitution forbid the Government from using the information? 
This question lacks an easy answer.  On one hand, as the Restatement of 
Torts explains, a person licensed to enter property cannot circumvent 
prohibitions levied against others:  
A grants permission to B, his neighbor, to enter A’s land and draw water 
from A’s spring for B’s own use.  A has specifically refused permission to C 
to enter A’s land and draw water from the spring.  At C’s instigation, B enters 
A’s land and obtains for C water from the spring.  B’s entry is a trespass.208   
 
 202 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2018) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)—(1) a person or entity 
providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any 
person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service; and (2) 
a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to 
any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained by that 
service[.]”). 
 203 See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 680 (4th ed. 2018) (“Importantly, § 2702 imposes 
restrictions only on providers of ECS and RCS that provide services ‘to the public.’  Nonpublic 
providers can voluntarily disclose information freely without violating the SCA.”). 
 204 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) & (c) (providing exceptions for disclosure of communications and customer 
records). 
 205 See 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (providing for civil actions). 
 206 18 U.S.C.  § 2702(c)(6); see also Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1222 (2004) (“[N]oncontent records 
can be disclosed to nongovernment entities without restriction.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6)). 
 207 See United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[S]uppression is not a remedy 
for a violation of the Stored Communications Act.  The Act has a narrow list of remedies, and—
unlike the Wiretap Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 2515—suppression is not among them.”). 
 208 Restatement (First) of Torts § 168 cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); see also Restatement (First) 
of Torts § 168 (“A conditional or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in 
so far as the condition or restriction is complied with.”); see 9 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW 
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that while 
property rights rest at the core of the Fourth Amendment, its prohibitions 
and permissions do not precisely conform to property law.209  On balance, 
when the Government grants a right against itself but not the public at large, 
we should respect the limitations on that right.  Thus, when the SCA permits 
data sharing with the public, prohibits data sharing with the Government, 
but declines to apply the exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment should 
not force the exclusionary rule’s application. 
Nonetheless, the Stored Communications Act does broadly prohibit some 
content sharing by public providers.  Where the exceptions prohibit sharing 
data with private parties but permit warrantless sharing with the 
Government, these would seem to fall within our unconstitutional conditions 
analysis in the previous part.210  Because they grant a broad right to exclude, 
the courts should treat that right as a Fourth Amendment property right. 
E.   Bailment Law 
Despite this Article’s title, we have spent surprisingly little time looking 
for insight from bailment law.  Principally this is because the most important 
question to answer was how to identify Fourth Amendment property.  But 
even after concluding that the Framers would credit modern substantive law 
and look for an exclusion right, we detoured leisurely through the exclusion 
rights granted by copyright, privacy law, and cybersecurity law before 
 
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 492 (1846) (“If A command or request B to take the goods of C, and B 
do it, this action lies as well against A as against B.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 51 (1991) (“A 
trespass may occur if the party, entering pursuant to a limited consent, i.e., limited as to purpose or 
place, proceeds to exceed those limits by divergent conduct on the land of another, as a conditional 
or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition or 
restriction is complied with.”); Lothar Determann, Internet Freedom and Computer Abuse, 35 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 429, 443–44 (2013) (“[P]roperty owners were always able to some degree to 
define limitations on authorizations in a number of different ways, including the following:  They 
can grant authorization subject to conditions precedent. . . . They can also grant authorization 
subject to continued conditions. . . . The property owner can also grant authorization subject to 
limitations . . . .”). 
 209 See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120–21 (2006) (“[T]he ‘right’ to admit the police to 
which Matlock refers is not an enduring and enforceable ownership right as understood by the 
private law of property, but is instead the authority recognized by customary social usage as having 
a substantial bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances.  Thus, to ask 
whether the consenting tenant has the right to admit the police when a physically present fellow 
tenant objects is not to question whether some property right may be divested by the mere objection 
of another.  It is, rather, the question whether customary social standing accords the consenting 
tenant authority powerful enough to prevail over the co-tenant’s objection.”); United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (“The authority which justifies the third-party consent does 
not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements . . . .”). 
 210 See supra Part III.C. 
August 2020] DIGITAL BAILMENTS 1307 
arriving at this Article’s namesake.  Admittedly, bailment law is a difficult, 
complicated subject.  Due to its tendency to incorporate broad principles 
from both tort and contract, one scholar has compared bailments to “the 
duck-billed, beaver-tailed platypus[, which] incongruously incorporates into 
a single species anatomical elements of apparently disparate provenance.”211  
Whether due to this difficulty or the sense that bailments treats a fairly 
isolated legal area, the subject is famously understudied.  In 1992, Professor 
R.H.  Helmholz noted that the field had garnered no systematic treatise in 
sixty years and very few law review articles.212  But though we may merit the 
sobriquet for those that rush in, we will at least briefly explore where angels 
fear to tread. 
Bailment law addresses the obligations owed when a person’s property is 
held by another.213  Though we rarely think about it, bailment law touches 
our lives on an almost daily basis.214  When I lend my drill to a neighbor, 
park my car in a commercial garage, or check my bag on an airline, bailment 
law governs the relationship.  One early 19th century author called these day-
to-day legal relationships “the principal springs and wheels of civil society[,]” 
suggesting that without their constant presence, “the whole machine [of 
society] would instantly be disordered or broken to pieces”; should they be 
destroyed, “the whole [human] species must infallibly be miserable.”215 
While the precise standards vary from state to state, bailment law often 
imposes three basic duties of care, depending on the bailment relationship.  
For bailees that act gratuitously, like the party host that finds a guest’s lost 
watch, the law imposes only a duty of slight care.216  For bailment 
 
 211 Eric Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 16 NEV. L.J. 659, 689 (2016). 
 212 See R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees:  The Elusive Uniform Standard of Reasonable 
Care, 41 KAN. L. REV. 97, 100 (1992) (“There has been no systematic treatise devoted to the 
American law of bailments in more than sixty years.  Law review articles devoted to the subject can 
be counted on the fingers of two hands.  The subject is distinctly out of fashion.”). 
 213 See id. at 97 (“[B]ailments are best defined simply as the rightful possession of a chattel by one who 
is not also the owner.”); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 2 
(1832) (“[A] bailment is a delivery of a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, and upon 
a contract, express or implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust.”). 
 214 See WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 1–2 (1818) (“[T]here is hardly a man 
of any age or station, who does not every week and almost every day contract the obligations or 
acquire the rights of a hirer or a letter to hire, of a borrower or a lender, of a depository or a person depositing, 
of a commissioner or an employer, of a receiver or a giver, in pledge . . . .”). 
 215 Id. at 2.  
 216 See Morris v. Hamilton, 302 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Va. 1983) (“A bailee who acts gratuitously is not held 
to the same standard of care as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay.  The latter owes 
a duty of reasonable or ordinary care, while a gratuitous bailee owes only a duty of slight care.  
Thus, in order for a bailor to recover from a gratuitous bailee, he must prove the bailee was guilty 
of gross negligence.”). 
1308 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol.  22:5 
relationships where each party benefits, like the commercial garage where I 
pay to park, the law imposes a duty of ordinary care.217  Or, as traditionally 
expressed, a person should care for another’s goods as he would his own.218  
For bailees that benefit alone, like my neighbor borrowing the drill, the law 
imposes a duty of extraordinary care.219  Explicit contracts often supplant 
these default duties.220  But states may also forbid such contracts where the 
relationship overly advantages the bailee; for example, states may forbid the 
commercial garage or coat check counter from absolving themselves with 
tiny type on the back of a pre-printed card.221 
Certain specific actions are always held to violate these duties.  For 
example, misdelivery—handing property over to someone other than the 
owner-directed recipient—is always a breach.222  And the owner’s rights avail 
against the world entire.  The owner can rightly demand that the third-party 
recipient return the property.223  This would seem to hold even against the 
Government.224 
 
 217 See id. 
 218 See R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 383 (1873) (“[I]f ordinary care is due, such as a 
prudent man would exercise in his own affairs, failure to bestow that amount of care is called 
ordinary negligence.”); JONES, supra note 214, at 6 (“[R]ational men use nearly the same degree of 
diligence in the conduct of their own affairs; and this care, therefore, which every person of common 
prudence and capable of governing a family takes of his own concerns, is a proper measure of that which 
would uniformly be required in performing every contract, if there were not strong reasons for 
exacting in some of them a greater, and permitting in others a less, degree of attention.”). 
 219 See, e.g., Ferrick Excavating & Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co., 484 A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. 1984) 
(“When the bailment is for the sole benefit of the bailee, the law requires great diligence on the part 
of the bailee, and makes him responsible for slight neglect.”). 
 220 See STORY, supra note 213, at 20 (“[P]rinciples [of liability regarding bailments], both in the civil 
and in the common law, are to be understood with this limitation, that there is no subsisting contract 
between the parties, which varies the general obligation resulting from them; for, if there be such a 
contract, that governs the case, unless it be against public policy, or positive law.”). 
 221 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 814–15 (“Bailees who deal in large numbers of standardized 
transactions, such as parking lots and coat check rooms, frequently issue receipts or tickets that seek 
to define the terms of the bailment agreement. . . . [W]e find evidence of fairly widespread 
legislative intervention to regulate limitations on liability on the part of bailees in these situations, 
and some evidence of judicial policing through doctrines such as unconscionability.”). 
 222 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 104 (1941) (“A carrier or other 
bailee who misdelivers the goods, by an innocent mistake, is a converter.  This liability has been 
extended even to a so-called ‘involuntary bailee,’ who comes into possession of the chattel by 
accident or mistake, and misdelivers it.”). 
 223 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 94, at 815 (“The bailor’s relationship with the third party will be 
governed by the bailor’s general in rem rights against ‘all the world.’  Pursuant to these rights, the 
bailor is of course entitled to demand that the third party return the goods or make good for their 
loss.”). 
 224 Cf.  PHILIP T.  VAN ZILE, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS 49–50 (2d ed. 
1908) (noting that even though the bailee may be excused if “he ha[s] been deprived of the property by due 
process of law and therefore cannot redeliver the property to the bailor,” the bailee’s duty “to protect 
the interests of his bailor” remains  in cases “where the bailor was not made a party.”). 
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The Supreme Court has regularly considered bailments as property 
under the Takings and Due Process clauses, though without referencing that 
body of law specifically.  For example, in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 
the Court held that interest income in IOLTA accounts belonged to the 
owner of the principal (though it expressed no opinion on whether the 
interest had been “taken” or whether “just compensation” was due).225  And 
in Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.  v.  Beckwith, the Court held that when a 
county clerk managed funds pending a dispute’s judicial resolution, both the 
principal and accumulated interest belonged to the creditors; by retaining 
the interest, the clerk was taking property without just compensation.226 
One enormous wrinkle affects whether bailment law governs digital 
assets.  Bailment law presupposes that the owner in fact owns the property 
and that it will be returned to the owner or handled according to the owner’s 
wishes.227  While this might apply to some digital data, like files stored with a 
cloud provider, vast amounts of collected data are either not the originator’s 
property or they have no expectation the data will be returned. 
IV.   PAPERS UNDER ANOTHER GUISE? 
Before addressing the individual places where digital documents can 
reside—like cloud hosting, e-mail services, other messaging providers, and 
metadata—we should first address one definitional piece that applies broadly 
across all these categories:  Are these digital documents the “papers” 
envisioned by the Fourth Amendment?  On this point, Founding sentiment, 
courts, and scholars all agree: Yes, digital documents are indeed the same 
papers, even if they use new and unfamiliar ink. 
Obviously, the Founding generation did not anticipate our connected 
world, with messages converted to digital signals and pulsed across the globe 
in fractions of a second.  But then as now, messages mirror the mind.  And 
the Framers held the same unequivocal sentiment:  The mind must remain 
sacrosanct. 
England’s experience in cases like Wilkes and Entick forged the Framers’ 
antipathy toward general warrants as a rule, and document searches 
 
 225 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (holding “that the interest income 
generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the owner of the principal”). 
 226 Webb’s Fabulous Pharms., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164–65 (1980). 
 227 See, e.g., Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Under Texas 
law, the elements of a bailment are:  (1) delivery of personal property by one person to another to 
be used for a specific purpose; (2) acceptance of such delivery; and (3) an express or implied contract 
that the purpose will be carried out and the property will then be returned or dealt with as otherwise 
directed.”). 
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particularly.  In Wilkes v. Wood, Chief Justice Pratt held that seizing Wilkes’ 
papers was an unforgivable offense:  “[O]f all offences . . . a seizure of papers 
was the least capable of reparation; . . . for other offences, an 
acknowledgment might make amends, but . . . for the promulgation of our 
most private concerns, affairs of the most secret personal nature, no 
reparation whatsoever could be made.”228  Entick’s counsel went further, 
calling document searches a torture of the mind, every bit as condemnable 
as torture of the body:  “[R]ansacking a man’s secret drawers and boxes, to 
come at evidence against him, is like racking his body to come at his secret 
thoughts.”229  In holding for Entick, Chief Justice Camden did not stretch 
quite that far, but nonetheless showed profound offense at “rifl[ing]” a man’s 
house and removing “his most valuable secrets.”230  The Court held that the 
Crown’s claimed power to search was “not supported by one single citation 
from any law book extant.”231  Similarly, the House of Commons recognized 
the particular sensitivity of documents:  “[P]apers, though often dearer to a 
man than his heart’s blood, and equally close, have neither eyes nor ears to 
perceive the injury done to them, nor tongue to complain of it, and of course, 
may be treated to a degree highly injurious to the owners . . . .”232 
This antipathy toward document searches translated easily across the 
Atlantic.  As Revolutionary author The Father of Candor wrote, papers that 
the Government seizes “are immediately to be thrown into the hands of some 
clerks, of much curiosity . . . who will . . . naturally amuse themselves with 
the perusal of all private letters, memorandums, secrets and intrigues, of the 
gentleman himself, and of all his friends and acquaintances of both sexes.”233  
Even specific warrants proved problematic, because “in that case, all a man’s 
papers must be indiscriminately examined, and such examination may bring 
things to light which it may not concern the public to know, and which yet it 
may prove highly detrimental to the owner to have made public.”234 
This idea that documents extend the inviolable mind into the physical 
world traditionally reached beyond the Fourth Amendment, linking it with 
 
 228 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) 490. 
 229 Entick v.  Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1038 (1765). 
 230 Id. at 1064. 
 231 Id. 
 232 16 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 
1803, at 10 (1813). 
 233 THE FATHER OF CANDOR, supra note 21, at 54–55. 
 234 Herbert Broom & George L. Denman, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Law 
608 (1885). 
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Fifth Amendment concerns.235  In resisting a subpoena to produce files about 
its Vice Chancellor, Oxford University argued that forcing the university to 
turn over incriminating documents would “tempt a man to make shipwreck 
of his conscience, in order to disculpate himself.”236  Chief Justice Lee agreed, 
concluding that the Crown could not compel self-incrimination.237 
As Professor Laura Donohue points out, this profound respect for private 
thoughts prevented document searches for nearly two hundred years.238  
Thus we drew a substantial buffer around freedom of thought, which Justice 
Cardozo called “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every 
other form of freedom.”239 
If the Fourth Amendment protects written thoughts, then their precise 
form proves immaterial.  Whether papyrus, vellum, or magnetic platters, all 
are protected papers.240 
 
 235 See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 808 (2005) (“Throughout 
the nineteenth century, courts looked to the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, in 
analyzing the validity of subpoenas, and most believed that the Fifth Amendment’s injunction 
against compelling a person to testify against himself prohibited the government from demanding 
incriminating documents from a suspect.  Late in the nineteenth century the Supreme Court 
expanded on this notion, by holding that such compulsion violated the Fifth Amendment and the 
Fourth Amendment’s restriction on unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 236 Donohue, supra note 21, at 1309 (quoting The King v. Dr. Purnell, 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (KB 1748)). 
 237 See id.  Modern Court precedent has decoupled the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  See Slobogin, 
supra note 235 (“At the turn of the twentieth century, however, the Court reversed itself, removing 
virtually all Fourth Amendment strictures on document subpoenas and, when the documents were 
corporate in nature, eliminating Fifth Amendment limitations as well.”).  This seems neither wise 
nor historically accurate. 
 238 Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553, 568 
(2017) (“For nearly two hundred years, the government could not obtain private papers—even with 
a warrant—when they were to be used as evidence of criminal activity.”). 
 239 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 
(1969). 
 240 Admittedly, this conclusion glibly oversimplifies the matter.  In this author’s view, all are protected 
papers, but defining “search” has proven difficult, given the differences between physical and 
electronic papers.  For example, if a police officer copied paper files by hand, obviously the officer 
searched them.  But to maintain the computer’s evidentiary integrity, police commonly make a 
perfect digital copy for any seized drives.  Normally no person views the data when the copy gets 
made.  Has a search occurred?  Multiple authors have weighed in on difficult questions like these.  
See, e.g., Richard A.  Epstein, Entick v Carrington and Boyd v United States:  Keeping the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments on Track, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 27, 48–49 (2015) (using an approach based on 
acquiring “new information”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 531, 547–48 (2005) (advocating an approach that finds a search where data “is exposed to 
human observation”).  This article focuses solely on defining Fourth Amendment digital property, 
without drawing boundary lines for searches.   
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V.   FOURTH AMENDMENT PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DIGITAL DOCUMENTS 
A.   Cloud Files 
More and more people utilize cloud services like Dropbox, Google Docs, 
and Microsoft OneDrive to store their files.241  The benefits are obvious: 
ubiquitous access to your data from every device you own.242 You can even 
control whether folders hold local copies or need to reach out to the cloud 
every time you access them.243  If you keep local copies, your data updates 
when you connect and remains ready on your device when you disconnect.244 
For Fourth Amendment purposes, are these cloud files our property?  Do 
we have the right to exclude others from them?  Indeed.  The Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act bars unauthorized individuals from accessing our files 
and sharing them with others.245  The Stored Communications Act generally 
prevents even our storage provider from doing the same.246  And bailment 
law should treat digital storage providers no different than physical storage 
providers.  Without a warrant, the Fourth Amendment should bar 
Government from delving through them. 
B.   E-Mails 
E-mail was arguably the Internet’s entire purpose.  When the network 
started as ARPANET, linking government facilities and major research 
 
 241 See, e.g., Kevin Curran, Can Dropbox Keep Its Paid User Growth Momentum Going?, REAL MONEY (Aug. 
10, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles/08/10/2018/can-dropbox-keep-
its-paid-user-growth-momentum-going (“Dropbox Inc.’s (DBX) paid users grew to 11.9 million in 
the second quarter, up 400,000 from the prior quarter and 1 million from the prior year quarter.”). 
 242 See, e.g., Easy File Syncing, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/features/sync (“Save a file to the 
Dropbox folder on your computer, and it will sync automatically to your mobile device.”). 
 243 See Smart Sync, DROPBOX, https://help.dropbox.com/installs-integrations/sync-uploads/smart-
sync (“Smart Sync is a Dropbox feature that helps you save space on your hard drive. . . . With 
Smart Sync, content on your computer is available as either online-only, local, or in mixed state 
folders.”). 
 244 See Easy File Syncing, supra note 242(“With the desktop app, locally synchronized folders and files are 
available even when you’re away from an internet connection.  Once you get back online, Dropbox 
will automatically synchronize your folders and files with all the latest changes.  You can also select 
files to access offline on your Android or iPhone smartphone, and even your iPad.”). 
 245 See supra Part III.C (discussing the use of The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as a tool for 
combating cybercrime). 
 246 See supra Part III.D (summarizing The Stored Communications Act’s general prohibitions). 
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institutions, it sought constant, unbreakable communication.247  And simple 
electronic messaging—e-mail—leveraged that connectivity. 
Surprisingly, the way e-mail works remains mostly unchanged.  Then and 
now, e-mail works with two servers, the sender and the receiver.  Users access 
a server, write their e-mail, and then instruct the server to send it to 
USERNAME@DOMAIN.  Their server looks up the domain and hands the 
e-mail to the server in charge of that domain.  Then the sending server keeps 
a copy in that user’s outbox.  The receiving server looks up the recipient in 
its user database and puts the e-mail in that user’s inbox.  When the user 
opens the e-mail, the server marks it as having been read. 
Certain details around this core design have changed as we change the 
way we use the technology.  For example, as more people acquired home 
PCs, they no longer logged directly into servers to send and receive e-mail.  
Instead, they composed e-mails on their home computer, often without 
connecting to the Internet.248  When they were ready to send a batch of e-
mails, their computer could dial their Internet provider.249  Their mail client 
would hand whole e-mail batches to the sending server.250  The e-mails 
would go from sending server to receiving server, then get sorted into the 
recipient’s inbox.251  But just like on the sending end, few recipients are 
logging directly on to their server.  Instead, their e-mail program would 
 
 247 Every major source agrees on this.  But the sources disagree on exactly what they feared would break 
the system.  Government sources suggest that ARPANET was insurance against nuclear war.  
See, e.g., Stephen J. Lukasik, Why the Arpanet Was Built, 33 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HISTORY OF 
COMPUTING 4, 4 (2011) (“Writing from the viewpoint of the person who signed most of the checks 
for Arpanet’s development, . . . [t]he goal was to exploit new computer technologies to meet the 
needs of military command and control against nuclear threats, achieve survivable control of US 
nuclear forces, and improve military tactical and management decision making.”).  Other sources 
suggest that they wanted persistent access to research computers across the country despite network 
changes or outages.  See, e.g., Mary Bellis, ARPAnet – The First Internet, ABOUT:  INVENTORS OF THE 
MODERN COMPUTER, http://theinventors.org/library/weekly/aa091598.htm (“[Former ARPA 
director Charles Herzfeld] claimed that ARPAnet was not created as a result of a military need, 
stating ‘it came out of our frustration that there were only a limited number of large, powerful 
research computers in the country and that many research investigators who should have access 
were geographically separated from them.’”). 
 248 See, e.g., Juno Online Services, WIKIPEDIA (May 17, 2020, 7:34 PM), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Juno_Online_Services&oldid=957234167 (“The 
user could write emails with the Juno client and would periodically sign in by dial-up.  Upon doing 
so, the Juno client would upload any emails the user had written . . . .”). 
 249 See id. 
 250 See, e.g., Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, WIKIPEDIA (May 11, 2020, 11:44 AM), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Simple_Mail_Transfer_Protocol&oldid=956078379 
(“Email is submitted by a mail client (mail user agent, MUA) to a mail server (mail submission 
agent, MSA) using SMTP on TCP port 587.”). 
 251 See id. (“Once the final hop accepts the incoming message, it hands it to a mail delivery agent (MDA) 
for local delivery.  An MDA saves messages in the relevant mailbox format.”). 
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periodically dial in, check for new mail, and download the mail to their local 
PC.252  The program would then either delete all the mail on the server or 
mark it as read.253 
But this client-server model has declined with webmail like Hotmail and 
Gmail, where we are effectively logging on to the servers themselves again.254  
With the substantial free storage space offered by these providers,255 they 
often become vast e-mail archives spanning years and even decades.  And 
with virtually every online system from hotels to retailers to transportation 
sending e-receipts, e-mail becomes an enormous information trove, even 
without accounting for all the poorly considered private messages sent and 
received. 
E-mails are among the few third-party digital documents that the courts 
have held protected under Katz.  In its pathbreaking decision United States v.  
Warshak, the Sixth Circuit explained that the defendant “plainly manifested 
a [subjective] expectation that his e-mails would be shielded from outside 
scrutiny . . . [g]iven the often sensitive and sometimes damning substance of 
his e-mails.”256  On the objective side, Warshak concluded that society 
considered e-mails at least as private as letters and phone calls, both  
protected under prior Fourth Amendment precedent.257  Confronting the 
 
 252 See id. (“Mail is retrieved by end-user applications, called email clients, using Internet Message 
Access Protocol (IMAP), a protocol that both facilitates access to mail and manages stored mail, or 
the Post Office Protocol (POP) . . . .”); Post Office Protocol, WIKIPEDIA (MAY 9, 
2020, 11:24 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Post_Office_Protocol&oldid=955
81360 (“Th[e] design of POP and its procedures was driven by the need of users having only 
temporary Internet connections, such as dial-up access, allowing these users to retrieve e-mail when 
connected, and subsequently to view and manipulate the retrieved messages when offline.”).   
 253 See Email Client, WIKIPEDIA (May 24, 2020, 5:24 PM), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Email_client&oldid=958593657 (“The Post Office 
Protocol (POP) allows the user to download messages one at a time and only deletes them from the 
server after they have been successfully saved on local storage. . . . However, there is no provision 
for flagging a specific message as seen, answered, or forwarded, thus POP is not convenient for 
users who access the same mail from different machines.  Alternatively, the Internet Message Access 
Protocol (IMAP) allows users to keep messages on the server, flagging them as appropriate.”). 
 254 This comes with the substantial caveat that mobile devices—designed to operate with many 
different servers—still send and retrieve e-mail with SMTP and IMAP/POP.  See, e.g., Setting Up 
POP/IMAP Email on an Android (Jellybean), NO-IP:  KNOWLEDGE BASE, 
https://www.noip.com/support/knowledgebase/setting-up-popimap-email-on-an-android-jelly
bean/ (providing readers with set-up instructions). 
 255 See, e.g., Chris Hoffman, How to Free Up Storage Space on Your Google Account:  The Ultimate Guide, HOW-
TO GEEK (July 12, 2017, 1:24 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/171788/how-to-free-up-
storage-space-on-your-google-account-the-ultimate-guide/ (“Every [Google] account gets 15GB of 
free space . . . .]”). 
 256 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 257 See id. at 284–86 (discussing protections for phone calls and letters and concluding that “[g]iven the 
fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy 
common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection”). 
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third-party issue, Warshak held that while some agreements between e-mail 
providers and subscribers might extinguish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, only clear contractual language would suffice.258  After all, routine 
incursions by maids and handymen do not render hotel rooms and 
apartments unprotected.259  Warshak recognized that its holding created 
tension with  Miller.  But it concluded that Miller could be limited to the 
business records at issue, which were both simpler and necessary for bank 
business.260  Though the Supreme Court has never taken up the issue, when 
Carpenter refused to extend the third-party doctrine to cell-site location data, 
the Court suggested that “the third-party doctrine does not apply to the 
‘modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’” and 
they should receive “full Fourth Amendment protection.”261 
For Fourth Amendment purposes, are these e-mails our property?  Do 
we have the right to exclude others from them?  Absolutely.  The Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act bars unauthorized individuals from accessing our e-
mail and sharing it with others.262  The Stored Communications Act 
generally prevents even our e-mail service provider from doing the same.263  
And bailment law expects that vendors holding our property temporarily will 
exclude others from it.  E-mail should remain as protected under a property 
theory as Warshak has protected it under a privacy theory. 
C.   Other Messaging Services—Snapchat, Telegram, Etc. 
E-mail remains one of the few messaging services that operates across 
servers owned by unrelated entities.  As discussed above, e-mail protocols like 
 
 258 See id. at 287 (“[W]e are unwilling to hold that a subscriber agreement will never be broad enough 
to snuff out a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 259 See id. (internal citations omitted) (“Hotel guests . . . have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their rooms .  .  .  even though maids routinely enter hotel rooms . . . . Similarly, tenants have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in their apartments . . . regardless of the incursions of handymen 
. . . .”). 
 260 See id. at 288 (limiting certain cases to business records at issue rather than an unlimited amount of 
confidential communications). 
 261 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018) (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2230 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).  The Court is speaking hypothetically here—“[i]f the third-party doctrine 
does not apply to the ‘modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’’ then the 
clear implication is that the documents should receive full Fourth Amendment protection”—
because the majority is fencing with Justices Kennedy’s and Alito’s dissents.  Id.  But the majority 
next suggests that modern-day “papers” like e-mails and cell-site location information should both 
receive protection: “We simply think that such protection should extend as well to a detailed log of 
a person’s movements over several years.”  Id.   
 262 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act being used as a statutory tool 
for combating cybercrime). 
 263 See supra Part III.D (detailing The Stored Communications Act’s general prohibitions). 
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SMTP, POP, and IMAP are all open standards, which let e-mail traverse 
networks and servers owned by many different companies and individuals.  
By contrast, systems like Snapchat, Telegram, Slack, and Facebook 
Messenger are closed protocols.  When you send a message on these services, 
it never leaves Snapchat, Telegram, Slack, or Facebook. 
But the same legal principles apply.  The messages are still messages.  The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act bars unauthorized individuals from 
accessing our messages and sharing them with others.264  The Stored 
Communications Act generally prevents even the service provider from 
doing the same.265  And bailment law expects that property will get delivered 
to the correct recipient.  These messages should remain similarly protected. 
D.   Metadata 
Metadata is “data about data.”266  In the Fourth Amendment context, it 
refers to the non-content information that surrounds our online activities and 
communications.267  The precise line between content and non-content 
information remains fuzzy and shifts with the context.268  Modern online life 
generates endless metadata.  And it can be shockingly intrusive.  Indeed, the 
cell-site location information at issue in Carpenter was almost certainly 
metadata, rather than content information.  As the Court pointed out, this 
data could provide enormous insight into a subject’s private life: “[A] cell 
phone—almost ‘a feature of human anatomy,’—tracks nearly exactly the 
 
 264 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act being used as a statutory tool 
for combating cybercrime). 
 265 See supra Part III.D (explaining the Stored Communications Act’s general preventions of service 
provider actions). 
 266 Piotr Kononow, What Is Metadata (With Examples), DATAEDO (Sept. 16, 2018), 
https://dataedo.com/kb/data-glossary/what-is-metadata. 
 267 See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Unlike what is gleaned from the 
more traditional investigative practice of wiretapping, telephone metadata do not include the voice 
content of telephone conversations.  Rather, they include details about telephone calls, including, 
for example, the length of a call, the phone number from which the call was made, and the phone 
number called.”); see also KERR, supra note 203, at 624 (“Contents of communications are the 
substance of the message communicated from sender to receiver, while non-content information 
refers to the information used to deliver the communications from senders to receivers and other 
network-generated information about the communication.  In the case of a telephone call, for 
example, a basic difference exists between the contents of the call (the communication) and mere 
information about the call (such as the phone numbers of the two parties and the duration of the 
call.”). 
 268 See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 137 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“[T]here is no general answer to the question of whether locational information is content.  Rather, 
a ‘content’ inquiry is a case-specific one turning on the role the location identifier played in the 
‘intercepted’ communication.”). 
August 2020] DIGITAL BAILMENTS 1317 
movements of its owner. . . . A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond 
public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”269  Metadata can 
prove every bit as intrusive as content information; indeed, sometimes it 
proves more so. 
But the statutory schemes we use to find property rights for content 
information find little purchase here.  The CFAA remains applicable, but it 
is not clear whether we have sufficient ownership to claim the data.  And the 
CFAA does not prohibit sharing by the service provider in any event.  The 
Stored Communications Act broadly permits providing non-content 
information “to any person other than a governmental entity.”270  As 
discussed in this Article’s section on the SCA, an argument certainly exists 
for triggering constitutional protections based on the SCA’s prohibition on 
government data sharing.271  But that conclusion seems by no means certain.  
Like the CFAA, bailment law bears only questionable relevance, with 
metadata’s ownership in question.  And even if the originator owned the 
metadata, they had no expectation it would be returned or delivered 
according to their instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Jed Rubenfeld rightly summarized the problems with a privacy-
focused Fourth Amendment: 
[A] Fourth Amendment dedicated to privacy must . . . ultimately reduce 
itself to duplicating private-sphere privacy expectations. 
  There is nothing wrong with a Fourth Amendment so conceived, except 
that it will have no understanding of what it really stands for.  It will see its 
role inevitably shrinking as information technology expands.  So long as 
Fourth Amendment privacy is parasitical on private-sphere privacy, the 
former must die as its host dies, and this host is undoubtedly faltering today 
in the networked, monitored and digitized world we are learning to call our 
own.272 
Narrowly focused and unable to keep pace with technology’s breakneck 
development, the Katz standard cannot protect us in a digital world.  Property 
offers more certainty.  And with that certainty comes—hopefully—quicker 
and more definitive judicial responses to the Government’s overreach. 
  
 
 269  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (citations omitted). 
 270 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2012). 
 271 See supra Part III.D (discussing the Stored Communication Act’s prohibition of some content). 
 272 Rubenfeld, supra note 14, at 118. 
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